For anyone who isn't a tankie who salivates over bootleather and might have some actual interest in the subject, please enjoy these excerpts from “Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades”:

From their points of departure as far as the eastern frontiers of the Byzantine Empire, Crusaders might reasonably expect to be provided with a certain amount of supplies by friendly rulers such as the king of Hungary and the Byzantine emperor; however, by and large they would depend on purchase to provide food for themselves and their animals. Unlike many other forms of warfare in medieval Europe, land Crusades to the Holy Land did not really have the option of having additional supplies of money brought to the armies during campaign, at least until they had reached the East. Therefore, although there might well be opportunities to gain plunder en route, whatever sums of money were estimated as being needed to purchase supplies would have to be carried on the journey.

We have no precise primary information on what Crusaders in 1095-96 estimated their expenses might be going to be but we can extrapolate from figures dating from the second half of the twelfth century. During preparations for the Third Crusade in 1189-90, Frederick Barbarossa and his advisers ordered that Crusaders should take sufficient funds for a campaign of two years' duration. The actual amount that this implied was given by Otto of St Blasien as three marks.7 This implied costs of 432 pence, 18 pence per month, or 0.6 pence per day.8 Yet this amount should probably be regarded as an absolute minimum which was intended to discourage the participation of non-combatants, and Otto stated that Crusaders were urged to take larger sums if they could.

Crusaders were expecting to take along their own money to provide for their own supply on the way there; there was no organized system of supply beyond ad-hoc arrangements made by individual lords.

Several of the issues involved in fund-raising and transport of money can be illustrated by the case of Godfrey of Bouillon, Duke of Lower Lotharingia. He raised the greatest funds by the sale or mortgage of his hereditary lands and offices. He sold his rights in the county of Verdun as well as the allods of Stenay and Mouzay to Bishop Richer of Verdun for a sum which is not recorded. He also mortgaged to Bishop Otbert of Liège the castle and territory of Bouillon along with an adjacent fief held from the archbishop of Rheims. The sources agree that the amount realized by this mortgage was at least 1,300 marks of silver.30 The bishop raised money to pay Godfrey and other Crusaders by ransacking the abbeys and churches of his diocese for jewellery, plate, and precious metals in other forms.

These measures went to such extremes that in 1104 Otbert was accused by his own cathedral chapter of having debased the coinage of the bishopric.31 If paid over as coin, the mortgage of Bouillon would have amounted to a total of between 187,200 and 216,000 pennies.32 Duke Godfrey had a mint at Bouillon, the only urban centre in his domains, but its capacity seems to have been fairly limited. The bishopric of Liège was better provided with mints, but a mint simply provided the technological infrastructure where coins could be produced.

We should not assume that all mints were permanently staffed or continuously in production. Given the obviously frantic nature of the bishop's fund-raising, it seems doubtful whether the episcopal mints or the ducal one at Bouillon could have processed this large an amount of bullion realized by sales to the bishop in time for the departure of Godfrey and his contingent.

There was no reliable revenue stream to provide for Crusade, nor a way to send revenues eastwards to accompany it, nor a way to ensure that even the revenues raised were in such form as to make exchange for personal goods of roughly equal value.

As the Byzantine populace was largely unfamiliar with silver, it is likely that part of the market organization required was the provision of standard weights and measures as well as facilities for money changing. There would have been general problems in agreeing on both fair prices and appropriate rates of exchange.

Food was often difficult to obtain in the quantities required by Crusaders in the western parts of the Byzantine Empire, zones often disputed with Hungarians and Serbs, as well as in the Empire's Anatolian territories, which had been devastated by Turkish invasions. Food supplies seem to have been abundant only in the central parts of the Empire. The further the armies advanced from Constantinople and Edirne and their hinterlands, the more difficult it was to obtain supplies and consequently the higher the prices demanded. Albert of Aachen relates that after crossing over to Asia Minor, Godfrey of Bouillon's followers were obliged to pay higher prices.4 Of course, Crusaders did not always feel obliged to pay for all the supplies they acquired. Godfrey promised the emperor that his troops would not plunder but reserved their right to take fodder for their horses where it could be found.

40 Albert of Aachen, Historia Hierosolymitana, II.xvii (p. 312). Similarly, Odo of Deuil stated that after Louis VII's army crossed into Byzantine territory from Hungary, the exchange rate it received was five pence to one stamenon. At Constantinople, the rate had improved to two pence per stamenon. Yet only three days beyond the capital, the exchange rate shot up again to five to six pence. See Odo of Deuil, De profectione Ludovici VII, bk 3

Crusaders from all contingents indulged in plundering and theft from markets in Byzantine territory. The leaders of the armies also received considerable sums of money from the imperial treasury. Between Christmas 1096 and Pentecost (24 May) 1097, Alexios Komnenos regularly sent a financial subsidy of gifts and measures of gold bezants (hyperpyra) and of copper coinage to the Crusade leaders. Albert of Aachen remarked of this that:

It was a remarkable thing, though, everything which the Duke distributed to the soldiers out of the Emperor's gift went back straight away to the royal treasury in buying food, and not only this, but even the money which the army had collected there from the whole world. No wonder, for as with wine and oil, so with corn and barley and all the food in the whole kingdom, it was sold at no one's price except the emperor's, and that is why the royal treasury was perpetually overflowing with money and could not be emptied by the presentation of gifts.42

Western Crusaders of all contingents were reliant on the organization and largesse offered by the Byzantines just to not starve as they passed through the Empire, and still plundered the region.

A length excerpt on the Second Crusade and the general condition of medieval Frankish armies:

Now, I have referred, as almost all writing on the subject does, to the armies of Louis VII and Conrad III but if we are to understand their logistics we need to understand what an army was like in the twelfth century. And to understand that, it is necessary to grasp something of the reality of a kingdom. Twelfth-century royal government was mediated by great lords. They controlled great resources and a king's control over them was fundamentally a matter of circumstance and personality. Odo of Deuil carefully pointed to this reality in his account of the assembly of Louis's army at Metz: "Although the king found nothing there which was subject to him by sovereign power, he nevertheless discovered that all were voluntarily willing to behave as subjects, as had already happened at Verdun."¹7

The implications are clear. Outside his own lands, Louis could not command. He could only cajole, persuade, occasionally coerce. In a military sense this meant that apart from those from his own demesne lands who joined the Crusade and those great lords in his immediate entourage, the king could not command unless men chose to obey. This situation was, of course, complicated by the conditions of a Crusade on which all were pilgrims equally sworn to God's service. The same problem had plagued the First Crusade. Then men and women had grouped themselves around major magnates. However, when circumstances were appropriate many of them had felt themselves free to change allegiances. One such was Gaston of Béarn, who began the Crusade with Raymond of St Gilles but ended it in association with Tancred, Raymond's bitter enemy.18 Moreover there was no obvious leader and the whole expedition was run by an uneasy, bickering committee of magnates. Holding these disparate elements together proved very difficult and ultimately sizeable forces did not continue on to Jerusalem.

Louis enjoyed the prestige of kingship, but relatively little direct authority. It is conventional to contrast Conrad's large but ill-disciplined forces with Louis's smaller but more controlled ones and there is plenty of evidence for the disorganization and ill-discipline of the Germans. Odo wrote that although supplies were plentiful in the Byzantine lands, the Germans pillaged savagely and even treated quite badly French Crusaders searching for food. A little later he recorded that the Germans showed "no moderation" and constantly fought with local people. Undoubtedly the Germans were unlucky to suffer losses of men and supplies in a flash flood as they were approaching Constantinople;1 however, when they reached Constantinople itself they sacked the pleasure-park of the Philopation. Odo wrote that they were divided and uncertain even at the moment of crisis when they faced the Turks and were defeated at Dorylaion. In a letter to Wibald of Corvey, Conrad III himself explained the defeat in part by saying that his army had been gravely short of food at the time.2

We only have Odo's word for the indiscipline of the Germans but certain factors suggest that he was telling the truth. In the first place, tension between Manuel and his former ally, Conrad, over the disorderly conduct of the German army at Constantinople appears to bear this out. In the second, Odo gave great prominence to the misdeeds of the Germans but did not hide the loose organization of his own forces, though historians have tended to ignore this. At Metz, where Louis gathered his army in mid-June 1147, he proclaimed the "Laws of the camp" to which all the leaders swore obedience. "But because they did not observe them well, I have not preserved them either", commented Odo.21 The French paused at Worms in late June to await the arrival of Normans and English under bishop Arnulf of Lisieux, and merchants brought food there by river. "Here", wrote Odo, "... we first perceived the foolish arrogance of our people."22

The French and their suppliers quarrelled and a riot ensued. At about this time a sizeable contingent of the army, worried by the cost of food, broke away and travelled on via Italy. As the main force entered the Byzantine empire many fell to pillaging and at least one group went on ahead in the hope of finding cheaper food. Its reputation became so bad that cities on its route became terrorized and provided only poor supply, thus increasing the need for pillaging. Odo admitted that at Constantinople very fair arrangements were made by Manuel for provisioning the army but, despite this, the French still pillaged and looted. The most revealing passage about the nature of provisioning, however, concerns their journey through Byzantine territory when Michael Branas, the governor of Niš attended to the king's needs and saw that his troops were fed. Louis passed on this food even at his own expense: "... but there preceded and followed him [Louis VII] many divisions who gained plenty for themselves, either from the market, whenever that was possible, or from plunder, because they had the power to do that."

Louis saw to those who were in a special sense his men, but not to others. This should not be a surprise, for his division was all that he could completely command and therefore all that he could supply. The rest had to make shift for what supplies they could and their obedience was, accordingly, qualified. What is known in detail of the logistics sustains this picture amply. At Regensburg the French leaders met a Byzantine delegation which demanded oaths of security from Louis and threatened that if he did not comply Manuel would order the burning of supplies prepared for him. In the event a decision on the question of the oaths was delayed. At the same city a supply fleet was assembled, perhaps raised by Alvisus of Arras and Leo of St Bertin who had been sent ahead to Regensburg to open discussions with the Byzantines. This fleet was described at first as ample but by the time they crossed the Drava river in Hungary it was described as small, which suggests that only a few ships accompanied them through Hungary. Here provisions were plentiful but some in the army, concerned about supply in Byzantine lands ahead, embarked carts with two or four horses to carry their supplies. These apparently broke down on the roads frequently, blocking the passage of pack-horses and holding up the army badly. The clear picture is of private provision, nobody in overall charge, and resulting chaos.24

This pattern of individual provision meant that each Crusader had to carry money, and Louis was much exercised by this need. In both his letters to Suger of St Denis, from the "Gates of Hungary" and Constantinople, he reminded his regent of his financial needs.5 A consequence of this forms a recurrent theme in Odo's account of the march: the presence in and near the army of money-changers and merchants.26 Odo commented that when the army entered Byzantine territory, although food was provided, a very poor rate of exchange was given, making it dear. Presumably merchants and money-changers in the army were there to arrange such matters with their Byzantine counterparts on behalf of the French. At Constantinople the rate of exchange was very good, but this changed when the army crossed the Bosporos and remained waiting for elements of their forces which had lagged behind. Odo provided a fascinating insight into the mechanics of supply

Discontent finally exploded and a Fleming led an assault on the money-changers who fled in such haste that innocent Crusaders trapped aboard their ships were beaten by the locals in revenge. Louis intervened immediately because disruption of money-changing facilities would have caused a major hiatus in the whole supply system. He demanded the surrender of the Fleming from the count of Flanders, hanged the man, and arranged restitution for the merchants and money-changers through the bishop of Langres. This all took time and in the absence of provisioning many ate what they had been saving for their journey into Anatolia. The implication of this concern with exchange-rates is that individuals and groups provided for themselves according to their means, using money and any other assets brought with them. It explains the paradox that there was pillaging and rioting in the midst of admitted plenty. Perhaps the king and other great men made some provision for the lesser people but this was a matter of charity rather than of central control.

All this time Louis VII was bickering over the terms of the oaths demanded by Manuel and also awaiting various French contingents which arrived late Constantinople. There was further delay when news arrived of the defeat of the German army at Dorylaion on 25 October. When agreement was finally reached, it included arrangements for provisioning. The French took imperial advice and sensibly set off through Byzantine lands in south-west Anatolia, the emperor guaranteeing that cities there would provide markets and fair rates of exchange. If this was not forthcoming they would have the right to pillage.2 The Crusade was now moving into areas where different problems of supply awaited. In reality, the Byzantines controlled only the cities of the Anatolian coast, although they had a tenuous hold over some of the plateau but subject to Turkish raids. It is hardly surprising that the coastal cities were suspicious and conceded supplies only grudgingly.

This is just a small taste of the chaos involved in the Crusader armies and (lack of) systemic logistics.

I'd like to say something along the lines of "I didn't realize tankie bootlicking included reactionary simping for feudal regimes because feudalism isn't the dreaded SHITLIBS", but the truth is that I've seen enough reactionary arcadian nonsense from tankie bootlickers that it's a tossup whether it's them, or an outright monarchist, whenever I see someone start to talk about how great and refined Christian Europe was, and how there's been a massive conspiracy to hide it by the dreaded bourgeois intellectuals.

The difference between them and monarchists, of course, being that a monarchist's ideal leader wears a lot of gold jewelry on their head; while a tankie's ideal leader wears a lot of gold jewelry on their chest instead.