Europe

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/54275021

When people talk about foreign influence operations, Russia is usually the first country that comes to mind. We picture troll factories, aggressive TV shows or conspiracy theories spreading on social media.

But a study published this June by Viginum, France’s national agency for countering foreign digital interference, describes a very different approach. At its centre is not loud propaganda, but an entire network of news portals that look like ordinary media outlets and focus mainly on how successful, innovative and essential to the world China supposedly is.

According to Viginum, the network consisted of 13 websites operated by China’s state broadcaster CGTN, or China Global Television Network. The portals published articles in English, French, Spanish and Vietnamese, presenting themselves as independent media outlets. In reality, they were part of a coordinated influence operation, which French authorities named Fawn Mianju.

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One of the best-known portals in the network was called Actu Méridien. It was a French-language website that looked just like an ordinary news outlet. The same network also included the Spanish-language Amigo News, English-language sites and Vietnamese-language publications.

The content of these sites did not focus on criticising the West. Quite the opposite. Readers were told about China’s achievements in aviation and artificial intelligence, Beijing’s leading role in the Global South, and how European countries could benefit from closer cooperation with China. One article, for example, attacked a programme by the French TV channel France 2 that covered the situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

This is exactly what sets Chinese influence operations apart from Russia’s. While Russian propaganda is often dominated by conflict, threat perception and confrontation, China’s goal is to build a positive image of itself. Freedom House describes this as a long-term strategy aimed at “telling China’s story well”. At its core is the image of China as a successful, trustworthy and indispensable partner.

Freedom House notes that in France, Chinese state media has for years tried to influence public opinion not only through its own channels, but also through partnerships, paid content and social media influencers. These have included both Facebook influencers and traditional media outlets that have published paid supplements from Chinese state media.

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The most interesting part of the story, however, is the role played by artificial intelligence. According to Viginum’s investigation, since late 2025 CGTN published nearly 3,000 articles, more than 2,300 of which were quickly adapted and republished on other websites in the network. This often happened less than an hour after the original story appeared.

The articles were not copied word for word. The texts were edited, shortened, adapted for different target audiences and rewritten so that they appeared to be original content. Investigators found that the texts showed unusually little natural variation in sentence length and punctuation. This is one of the signs associated with automatically generated or AI-assisted content.

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One mistake led back to CGTN

The strongest evidence linking the network to China’s state broadcaster came from an unexpected place. The administrator of one portal, Actu Méridien, left behind a login trail that led Viginum investigators to a senior project manager at CGTN Digital.

In addition, investigators found a hidden webpage on Actu Méridien’s server that had been built to resemble CGTN’s official website.

An anonymous Viginum analyst told Le Monde that the portal’s technical setup pointed to “a well-resourced actor”. The website was not running on a single server, but used a distributed architecture, professional SEO tools and several different infrastructure components.

Still, it did not become successful propaganda

Perhaps the most surprising part is that, despite the scale of the effort, the operation was not particularly successful. The network was supported by Facebook and Threads accounts, and advertising campaigns were shown to users in as many as 89 countries. Yet individual articles usually received no more than around 15,000 views.

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Influence operations no longer have to look like propaganda.

There is no need for loud voices, militant slogans or obvious fake news. A website that resembles an ordinary news portal is enough. An article about China’s green transition or technological success is enough. And so is artificial intelligence that can adapt the same message for dozens of different target audiences within minutes.

The question is no longer only whether a news story is true or false. The question is who is telling stories about the world, what kinds of stories are being told, and whether the reader even notices that the “news” in front of them was not produced in an independent newsroom, but far away in Beijing.

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cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/54135854

Great Britain, France and Germany on Wednesday issued a rare joint statement expressing alarm over Chinese activities east of the self-ruled island of Taiwan, where China earlier this month deployed coast guard patrols.

The de-facto embassies of the three European nations in the Taiwanese capital Taipei said the “novel Chinese activity,” which was not specifically identified, endangered regional stability.

China, which claims democratically governed Taiwan as its breakaway province and has not ruled out the use of force to annex the island, called the maneuvers earlier this month a “maritime traffic enforcement and hydrographic survey operation.”

Chinese state media said the activities were “sending a pointed warning” to Japan and the Philippines over an announcement that the countries would discuss their maritime boundaries in waters that Beijing views as its own.

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“These actions ⁠threaten regional stability and the freedom of navigation and safety of international shipping. We reiterate our opposition to any unilateral change to the status quo, particularly by threat or use of force or coercion,” the [joint European] statement said.

The offices also called for navigational rights and freedoms and respect for the safety of all seafarers.

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Beijing’s tensions with Tokyo also have increased since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi last year suggested the country’s military could get involved if China takes action against Taiwan.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/54977089

Archived

France is not only facing the threat of Russian or Iranian interference but China's growing influence on its territory. Following a year-long investigation, counterintelligence services shut down nine clandestine "police stations" in early 2026 that were operating in France on behalf of Beijing's interests.

According to the Interior Ministry, three "heads" of these shadow police stations, all Chinese nationals, faced expulsion measures. They were tasked with monitoring the Chinese diaspora and tracking down regime opponents to forcibly return them to China. Two have already been expelled. On June 9, before the Council of State, France's highest administrative court, the public rapporteur recommended that the third expulsion be confirmed.

Less spectacular than Russian destabilization operations but just as active, Beijing's clandestine activities abroad have largely relied on Chinese nationals without direct links to the Chinese state. A law passed on June 28, 2017, on intelligence, created legal obligations for Chinese citizens and companies to assist in collecting information as part of the "United Front," making every Chinese national a potential spy. On June 1, 2023, the European Parliament called on "member states and Union authorities to investigate the alleged existence of these police outposts and to take coordinated action against any illegal activity linked to the Chinese United Front Work Department in Europe."

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For the Interior Ministry, these undeclared clandestine stations are extensions of Chinese police stations on French territory and operate under the orders of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), China's main police authority. Most of these structures that are active in France, especially in the Paris region, were set up within the Chinese community or cultural associations. In addition to hunting dissidents, they provide administrative services such as issuing passports and gathering intelligence to recruit informants, described as "talents." The Chinese community in France numbers around 600,000 people.

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The case of Ni Chaowen, 57, head of a clandestine police station, was brought before the Council of State on June 9. According to the Interior Ministry, Ni served as president of the Fujian Association of Industrialists and Merchants (FAIM) since 2023, but behind this organization, he was actually running a clandestine police station linked to the Chinese MPS.

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French authorities decided to take a tougher line against these clandestine Chinese police structures after cracking down in 2024 on the activities of intelligence agents officially listed at the Chinese Embassy in Paris. The station chief of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS, or Guoanbu, China's intelligence service) and his deputy were asked to leave France after orchestrating, in March 2024, an attempted forced repatriation of a political dissident.

[...]

Apparently displeased with the publicity surrounding these cases, Chinese authorities tried, both in the matter of secret agents assigned to the embassy and in the case of nationals implicated in the "shadow police stations" affair, to plead their case with the French Foreign Ministry. Questioned on the matter, a senior diplomat at the French Foreign Ministry confirmed that Chinese diplomats had come to defend their "good faith" and that of their compatriots. In return, they only obtained a pledge that France would act discreetly regarding the measures taken against them.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/53878559

The Netherlands will not back down from regular military deployments to the Indo-Pacific despite a recent tense naval encounter with China, the country’s defense minister said, signaling that the incidents will not deter European engagement in the region.

“We are not here to seek a conflict, but we will keep coming back,” Dilan Yeşilgöz-Zegerius told The Japan Times in an interview Monday following the arrival of Dutch frigate HNLMS De Ruyter in Tokyo for a three-day port call.

The guided-missile frigate was involved in an incident last month near the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, where the Chinese Navy reportedly subjected it to electronic interference.

The frigate continued its planned mission, later transiting the sensitive Taiwan Strait before arriving in Japan, but the event highlighted ongoing tensions between Chinese forces and foreign militaries operating in waters Beijing claims as its own.

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Yeşilgöz-Zegerius was unequivocal that such incidents would not prompt the Netherlands to scale back its Indo-Pacific engagement, insisting that Dutch naval operations are conducted in accordance with international law and the principle of freedom of navigation — and that the deployments are far from symbolic.

“For the Netherlands, it’s very important to send a frigate through this region every two years because the safety, security and economy of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked with those of the Netherlands and the rest of Europe,” she said.

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“If something were to happen here [in the Indo-Pacific], the effects would be felt acutely in Europe — even more so than in the Strait of Hormuz,” referring to the crucial Middle Eastern waterway that has remained largely closed amid the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran.

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The minister confirmed that Chinese officials had raised the naval encounter during bilateral and panel discussions at last month’s Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore, where Dutch military officials reaffirmed the legal basis for the transit while keeping the door open to dialogue.

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While encounters between Chinese, U.S. and regional forces in the South China Sea occur regularly, publicly acknowledged incidents involving European warships remain comparatively uncommon, making the De Ruyter episode one of the most visible Chinese-European military interactions in the region so far this year.

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Archive Today link

This is the hottest pre-summer we've had - so far

The report was adopted on Tuesday by 434 votes in favour, 128 against and 104 abstentions, the parliamentary press service announced.

Transnational repression was described in the text as deliberate acts or threats by states and authoritarian regimes — or state-linked entities and proxies — to threaten, silence, coerce or harm people living abroad, as well as their support networks and family members.

MEPs said these actions pose a threat to democracy and the protection of human rights, and amount to foreign interference.

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Targets can include dissidents, journalists, activists, academics and members of diaspora communities, as well as their families, according to the European Parliament.

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They also called for measures to share best practice between member states and floated the appointment of an EU coordinator to help develop a wider strategy, including action against digital threats, abusive Interpol “red notices” — requests to locate and provisionally arrest people pending extradition — and “consular coercion”, which the report described as pressure from embassies and consulates.

“For many people living in exile in Europe, distance doesn't guarantee safety. Authoritarian regimes actively seek to silence critics beyond their own borders,” the report’s rapporteur, Hannah Neumann, said in the statement published by the European Parliament.

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The EU and four Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) States (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles) concluded negotiations on an enhanced Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

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This Agreement will set a new standard for EU-Africa economic relations by providing clear rules and opportunities on:

• Services and investment: the enhanced EPA improves legal certainty and conditions for companies supplying services in each other's market. It also provides greater predictability for investors and ensures fair and non-discriminatory treatment.

• Public procurement: businesses will have access to clear and transparent information on public procurement opportunities. This will make it easier for businesses on both sides to take part in public tendering and will support ESA States' expected economic growth and modernization plans.

• Intellectual property: the enhanced EPA establishes a modern and predictable framework covering all major categories of intellectual property and strengthens enforcement tools to support innovative and creative industries in ESA States. It will also protect 135 EU Geographical Indications (GIs) in Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles, after a transition period.

• Digital trade: the deal will make it easier to carry out digital transactions and trade using electronic means without applying customs duties on electronic transmissions. It will enhance online consumer protection and reduce unnecessary red tape. This allows the EU and the ESA States to promote and support digital trade more widely.

• Sustainability: the deal contains binding and enforceable commitments, as well as cooperation provisions, in a dedicated Trade and Sustainable Development chapter.

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The EU is ESA4's largest trading partner, accounting for 24% of its total trade in goods and for 33% of its total trade in services.

In 2024, total trade in goods and services between the EU and the ESA4 States reached €9.7 billion, comprising €5.2 billion in EU imports and €4.5 billion in EU exports.

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The clandestine bank, whose logistical base was located in Prato, north-west of Florence, has been run since 2021 by a Chinese national, officials said.

The operation acted as a “global broker at the service of organised crime, offering secure channels for paying for huge drug consignments without any physical movement of cash and guaranteeing total anonymity of financial flows”, police said on Monday in a statement.

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Drug cartels, such as Albanian trafficking organisations active in Italy, and the Italian mafia, were clients, it said.

Under-the-radar money transfers run by the Chinese mafia, known as Fei Chien or “flying money”, are used by Italian criminal organisations for drug-related payments.

The hard-to-trace system allows someone to pay a broker in Italy who has an agent in another part of the world who will pay the same amount to the intended recipient.

Police said they had arrested 41 individuals in Italy and Spain linked to the network, with charges ranging from criminal conspiracy and drug trafficking to money laundering and aiding and abetting illegal immigration.

A branch of the organisation managed a “lucrative illegal immigration network from China, which flew migrants to Belgrade before transporting them – or forcing them to march to the Hungarian border through mountainous terrain – to the European Union and the final destination of Italy, police said.

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[Chinese] migrants were charged up to €9,500 (£8,200) for the journey to Prato, Turin, or the province of Verona.

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The small city of Prato, the heart of Italy’s textile industry, is home to one of the largest Chinese communities in Europe – and in recent years has been a battleground for rival Chinese mafia groups warring to control the market for clothes hangers and freight transport.

The Chinese mafia, which is also engaged in illegal betting dens, prostitution and drugs, helps supply Prato’s textile industry – primarily the fast-fashion sector – with workers of various nationalities.

They are often exploited, paid about €3 an hour and working 13 hours a day, seven days a week, police investigations have shown.

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Archived

On June 16, between 18:00 and 21:00, the rights organization Safeguard Defenders (SD) releases its latest report: Behind Bars - A Survey on Detention Centre Conditions in China.

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The event, at Grémio Literário in Chiado, Lisbon, features direct testimony from two former European detainees: Peter Dahlin (Sweden) and Peter Humphrey (United Kingdom). Joining them is Grace Chen (Canada), former legal adviser to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture.

In recent days, there have been at least two attempts to cancel or disrupt the Lisbon event.

In a letter dated June 5, the Embassy urged the American Club of Lisbon to reconsider "offering a platform for actions that vilify China".

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Days later, on June 12, one of the many X accounts impersonating Safeguard Defenders posted a doctored copy of the event poster. The fake changed the date, time, venue and location to mislead potential attendees. The same account pushed the false details to other users in the China human rights space by direct message.

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The move against the Lisbon event is only the latest in a long line of PRC attempts - many of them successful - to suppress information that exposes widespread, systematic human rights abuse in China. Recent examples include pressure on German cities to drop their support for Tibet, and the cancellation of RightsCon in Zambia after sustained PRC pressure on the local government.

The CCP's "red line" on any public discussion of its rights record - anywhere - is the flip side of its propaganda and influence machine. To advance an increasingly aggressive agenda at home and abroad, the Party works to set and police every narrative about China. Anything that contradicts it must be silenced.

These efforts violate fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in international treaties, regional instruments, and democratic constitutions. When the PRC suppresses those rights on foreign soil, it commits transnational repression and an unacceptable breach of sovereignty.

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The report

Behind Bars - A Survey on Detention Conditions in China draws on interviews with 84 former detainees. It finds that shocking abuses continue without relent across the country's 2,600-plus facilities, set for release June 16.

These include police beatings, the illegal denial of access to lawyers, and the use of inmate enforcers to keep order through intimidation and violence.

The report also compares domestic and international law and reviews legal commentary, tracing these abuses to the absence of clear protections for detention centers, exploitable legal loopholes, and weak oversight of detention-center police and practices.

As China's surveillance state shrinks the pool of public data and makes speaking out riskier, Behind Bars is a vital addition to the evidence on the systematic abuse of detainees - Chinese and foreign alike.

It is the first of two reports. A companion survey on prison conditions in China follows July 18.

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Ukraine and Moldova will take a decisive step towards joining the EU on Monday, as they embark on the first phase of membership negotiations.

The start of substantive negotiations, launched by senior EU officials and ministers from both countries in Luxembourg on Monday [June 15], will be a highly symbolic moment for the two countries that were both part of the former Soviet Union. It comes after Russia has intensified its bombardment of Ukrainian towns and cities, while sustaining huge losses for little territorial gain.

Ukraine and Moldova were quickly accepted as EU candidate countries in 2022, having filed applications days after Russia’s full-scale invasion. But despite a symbolic decision to open talks in June 2024, substantive negotiations were blocked by Hungary’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Orbán.

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The election of a new Hungarian government in April paved the way for EU member states to agree unanimously last Friday to open “the first cluster”, the chapters of the EU rulebook covering rule of law and democracy. Launching this cluster opens the door to talks on other areas, such as the single market, the environment, economic and social policy.

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Web Archive link

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney says Canada and France will deepen their defence and industrial co-operation through a new general security of information agreement.

Carney says the agreement will facilitate the exchange of classified intelligence related to the defence, space, artificial intelligence and aerospace sectors.

Carney made the comments in a joint statement alongside French President Emmanuel Macron at the Palais de l'Élysée in Paris on Friday.

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Dutch customs police at the Port of Rotterdam seized a cargo ship bound for Russia and arrested the captain on charges of evading Western sanctions.

The vessel regularly operated between Rotterdam and St. Petersburg and carried several containers filled with vehicle parts such as doors, air filters and windshields.

A customs officer said that the export of such cargo is banned under European sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine.

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Web Archive link

Thirteen fake news websites launched in 2025 promoted China in a one-sided manner. An investigation by the French government agency Viginum has established that they were directly connected to CGTN, China's state-run television channel.

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On Thursday, June 4, Viginum – the French government watchdog against foreign digital interference – revealed the existence of a network of fake news sites in multiple languages, all linked to a state media outlet under the control of the Chinese Communist Party, China Global Television Network (CGTN). This discovery has unveiled a textbook case of a superpower attempting to manipulate public opinion in Western countries.

Nicknamed "Fawn Mianju" by French authorities, the operation was first exposed in the summer of 2025 by the American cybersecurity company Graphika. At that time, Graphika identified 11 websites and 16 English-language social media accounts on Facebook, Instagram, Mastodon, Threads and X, all uncritically relaying CGTN articles and specifically targeting young people. Other sites shared this content in French ("Actu Méridien"), Spanish ("Amigo News") and Vietnamese.

Mainly published between March 2015 and February 2026, the fake articles posted on "Actu Méridien" promoted Chinese aerospace and artificial intelligence, China as the leader of the "Global South," and environmental initiatives, as well as the supposed benefits for France in aligning with Chinese interests. Another article, published in several languages, criticized a France 2 television report on the treatment of Uyghurs in China.

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After several months of online investigation, Viginum experts managed to establish that these sites, which were now numbering 13, were directly linked to the state-run CGTN channel, which is overseen by the Chinese Communist Party.

In addition to the fact that the domain name was registered in Beijing and purchased from Alibaba Cloud, a Chinese digital giant, the site used a distributed architecture – meaning it was simultaneously duplicated across several servers. This more expensive setup, along with the use of paid plug-ins to boost internet search rankings, "suggests an actor with significant resources," explained a Viginum analyst, who requested anonymity.

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These sites display two essential characteristics of a digital interference operation: secrecy and coordination. Despite several campaigns to purchase visibility on Facebook and Threads, targeting a total of 89 countries – mainly in French-speaking Africa – they never managed to break through beyond 15,000 views. The most "liked" posts received 39% of their likes from users located in Burundi, whose sole activity was to interact favorably with Chinese pages.

Given the limited visibility of these sites and their associated accounts, this operation can be considered an operational failure; in fact, "Actu Méridien" has been inactive for several months. Nevertheless, Viginum warns that these sites demonstrate China's determination to promote its narrative to populations in Western countries – including through clandestine means; its growing prowess in using LLMs to automate this kind of production; and, finally, its objective to target both young people and French-speaking Africa.

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Archive Today link

At least 30 agents operating on Beijing’s behalf have been uncovered in the European area over the past two years.

Archived

Chinese espionage in the European Union and neighboring countries reveals its full scope when certain pieces are connected. The May 20 arrest in Germany of a German couple of Chinese origin who were taking military-technology information from universities is a particularly notable case. But it is only one of many. The episode exposes a strategy of large-scale, coordinated infiltration when placed alongside other arrests in EU member states and neighboring countries. In total, around 30 agents and collaborators have been uncovered in Europe and its vicinity in just the past two years; some were arrested, several expelled, and others are awaiting trial.

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The Italian government expelled eight Chinese nationals in March on charges of surveilling and intimidating members of the diaspora. This pattern of harassment, known as China’s “clandestine police stations,” came to light in 2022 when the Dutch government acted against two covert offices in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The NGO that exposed the case, Safeguards Defenders, reported that Beijing had set up 102 unauthorized security offices in 53 countries, including Spain.

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The MEP Engin Eroglu [chair of the Delegation for Relations with the People’s Republic of China in the European Parliament] provides several figures to illustrate Europe’s “structural vulnerability” to Beijing’s influence and espionage operations: “China’s security and intelligence workforce is estimated at between 100,000 and 800,000 personnel, according to various estimates. By comparison, the United States has about 30,000 intelligence officers, and EU member states collectively have approximately 35,000 to 40,000.”

The MEP believes Beijing is interested in future-facing sectors such as semiconductor technology and artificial intelligence. “And Germany, with its strong industrial and research base, remains a key target.”

It was precisely in the EU’s largest economy that, in April 2024, Jiang G., an assistant to far-right MEP Maximilian Krah of Alternative for Germany (AfD), was arrested for spying for China. Around that time, three German citizens identified as Thomas R., Ina R. (a married couple) and Herwig were accused of illegally transferring military and scientific technological know-how to Beijing. They used publicly funded research projects to gather information useful to China’s maritime combat capabilities.

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Cutting-edge technology is fertile ground for bribery. About 100 Belgian police officers raided the Brussels offices of Chinese tech giant Huawei in March 2025 and more than 20 lobbyists’ homes. At least eight people were charged in Belgium, including a senior European Huawei executive. All are alleged to have been involved in a scheme designed to prevent a ban on Chinese 5G technology in Europe. In addition, the Belgian public prosecutor asked the European Parliament to lift the immunity of five MEPs.

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Belgium already knew how far Beijing could influence local and European politics. In December 2023, an investigation by Le Monde, the Financial Times and Der Spiegel revealed that Frank Creyelman, a veteran politician from the far-right Flemish party Vlaams Belang (VB), had received payments for at least three years (between 2019 and 2022) from China to influence both Belgium and the EU on issues such as the situation of the Uyghur minority and pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Creyelman was expelled from the party.

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Traditional espionage that targets scientists and military personnel continues to yield results in the age of artificial intelligence. In Greece, on February 5, Air Force Colonel Christos Flessas, 54, was arrested on accusations of passing information of high strategic interest to China. The officer held a top-level NATO security clearance that allowed him access to highly valuable information.

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On the same day Colonel Flessas was arrested in Greece, France uncovered another case. Two technicians, aged 27 and 29, who entered France to perform legal work as engineers, were detained. Two other men of Chinese origin with residency in France provided the logistics: a house rented via Airbnb in the Gironde department (southwest France, near Bordeaux). The Paris prosecutor’s office said the aim was to intercept Starlink satellite communications and military data to transmit to China. The agents made the mistake of installing a two-meter satellite dish in the rented property’s garden, which caused interference and knocked out internet service in the area. Neighbors alerted the authorities and the two engineers face up to 15 years in prison.

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After Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine, Poland stepped up its counterespionage efforts. And they are paying off. In February, police arrested a 32-year-old Montenegrin citizen at Warsaw’s Chopin Airport who was the subject of a European arrest warrant. The suspect was accused of passing intelligence to China from neighboring Lithuania. That same February, Poland approved restrictions to prevent vehicles made in China from entering protected military facilities.

Henrietta Levin, senior fellow at Spain’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, says by videoconference that the EU’s priority should be to secure NATO-critical infrastructure such as ports, water systems, power grids, and communications. Beijing acquired 67% of the Piraeus port’s shares in 2016 — the main Greek port and one of eastern Europe’s largest distribution hubs.

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Meanwhile, Beijing has not neglected countries close to the European Union. In Norway, a Chinese woman was arrested on May 8 on the island of Andøya, where a space-launch base is located, on suspicion of complicity in a serious espionage attempt related to state secrets, Efe reported. And on May 17, a Chinese national was detained in the same country on the same charge.

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One of the most decisive and explicit counterespionage battles Beijing is fighting is in the United Kingdom, known for its powerful intelligence services. One of the most recent cases resurfaced this month with a jury verdict finding a former immigration officer and his contact guilty of working for Chinese intelligence. They were accused of using access to immigration databases to track dissidents and pro-democracy activists from Hong Kong who had sought refuge in the U.K. And in March, David Taylor, the husband of Labour MP Joani Reid, was arrested, also accused of spying for China.

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In that complex balance between security and economic benefit, the EU’s major challenge is no longer merely detecting spies but forging a common shield without weakening its considerable commercial muscle.

Russian Tundra-series satellites belonging to the EKS system are causing brief GPS signal disruptions across Europe, according to the findings of a recent study by scientists at the University of Texas and Spanish technology company GMV.

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Researchers have recorded at least 75 incidents since 2019 across a territory ranging from Iceland to Italy. In three cases, the scientists reliably identified Russian military satellites designed to give early warning of missile launches as the source of the interference. In the remaining cases, the collected data was insufficient for a definitive attribution, but the signal type was identical across all incidents. Each disruption lasted less than ten seconds and did not lead to serious consequences, as most devices normally switch to a backup signal or the last known location. Nevertheless, the interference has affected the GPS systems of the United States, China, and the European Union, while Russia’s GLONASS is unaffected.

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Satellite jamming is not the only threat vector. As study co-author Todd Humphreys, director of the Radionavigation Laboratory at the University of Texas, told The Insider, the scale of GPS interference depends significantly on its carrier. For a source installed on an aircraft, the effective range can reach 450 kilometers, while ground-based sources can affect a radius of no more than 50 kilometers. According to Humphreys, Russia can change its strategy from month to month, targeting individual aircraft with precision before switching over to block entire sectors of airspace or create broadband interference. Attributing the source is technically possible to within approximately 100 meters and is generally carried out from space.

Lithuania's telecommunications regulator previously recorded an increase from three spoofing antennas along the border of Kaliningrad Oblast to 36. It warns that Russia is now capable of falsifying GPS signals up to 450 kilometers deep into European territory.

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Web Archive link

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/53107907

The European Union will provide more than €50mn in immediate financial assistance to Armenia and help find alternative markets for Armenian exports after Russia imposed new trade restrictions on the South Caucasus nation, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on June 4.

Following a phone call with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, von der Leyen accused Moscow of using economic pressure against Yerevan as Armenia continues to deepen ties with the European Union.

"Russia's recent restrictions targeting Armenia are nothing short of economic coercion, and it is unacceptable," von der Leyen said.

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"By extending export restrictions on Armenian products, Moscow is weaponising economic relations for political pressure. We know this playbook all too well. This is why Europe stands firmly with Armenia."

The support package will include immediate financial assistance worth more than €50mn, measures aimed at easing trade in certain Armenian products, particularly agri-food goods, and practical assistance for sectors affected by the Russian restrictions, the Commission said.

Among the measures announced is support for Armenia's flower industry after Russia recently restricted imports of Armenian flowers, citing what Armenian officials have described as questionable phytosanitary concerns. Von der Leyen said a shipment of 10,000 Armenian flowers was due to arrive in Latvia on June 5 and that further deliveries would follow.

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The EU has become one of Armenia's most important political and economic partners. Brussels launched a Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia in 2024, and von der Leyen said EU support under the programme had already helped 7,000 businesses and contributed to the creation of more than 20,000 jobs.

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Looking ahead, the Commission president said the EU remained committed to implementing an ambitious Connectivity Partnership agreed with Armenia. She welcomed the recent reopening of regional trade routes involving Turkey, including railway links through Georgia and Turkey, describing them as "an excellent step forward".

"Armenia has the potential to become a strategic hub connecting Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia," she said.

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[Armenians are set to vote on the country's future geopolitical direction on June 7. The election will be a test of public opinion in the long-standing Russia ally, where the population is increasingly eyeing the EU.]

Web Archive link

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/52984894

An interview with Professor Aleksandra Gasztold of the University of Warsaw in Poland during her visit in Taiwan. She discusses what East Asia and Eastern Europe can learn from one another about democratic resilience, hybrid threats, AI-driven security, and the future of modern conflict.

Question: Taiwan is often described as one of the world’s most resilient democracies under growing external pressure. Arriving in Taipei as a security researcher from Poland, what struck you most immediately about the atmosphere here?

Aleksandra Gasztold: What struck me most in Taiwan was the remarkable sense of normality under constant pressure. Taiwan exists in what could almost be described as a permanent low-intensity siege. It is on the frontline of geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific region, yet everyday life continues with extraordinary resilience.

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To put this into perspective, Taiwan experiences persistent and significant cyberattack attempts targeting government networks and critical infrastructure. While Taiwan recorded an average of 2.63 million cyberattack attempts per day in 2025, Poland’s national CSIRT teams handled roughly 273,000 cybersecurity incidents across the whole year. [Editor’s note: CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) refers to a national cybersecurity response unit.]

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This adversarial activity also extends far beyond cyberspace. China regularly conducts gray-zone operations around Taiwan, including airspace incursions, naval intimidation, disinformation campaigns, and pressure on maritime infrastructure and undersea communication systems. Cyberattacks are often coordinated with military exercises or politically sensitive moments. The objective is not necessarily immediate military escalation, but the gradual normalization of psychological pressure and strategic uncertainty.

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We can observe similar dynamics in NATO’s Eastern Flank in the context of Russian hybrid operations. These include cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, sabotage attempts, disinformation campaigns, manipulation of migration pressures on the border with Belarus, GPS signal interference

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What Taiwan demonstrates very clearly is that democratic openness does not automatically produce vulnerability. In many Western societies, even limited crises quickly become politically polarized. Every pressing social issue can be politicized. Taiwan, by contrast, has developed strong forms of social coordination and civic resilience that allow society to function under continuous pressure. Resilience is embedded in civic culture.

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Taiwan is certainly one of the most important contemporary cases for understanding gray-zone conflict. However, I would avoid portraying it as unique.

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Ukraine is perhaps the clearest contemporary example of how conventional warfare now overlaps with cyber operations, strategic communication, disinformation campaigns, and attacks on civilian morale and critical infrastructure. The Russian invasion demonstrated that the battlefield today extends far beyond territory into digital networks, media ecosystems, and societal cohesion itself.

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We observe similar dynamics ... in the Middle East, particularly in the confrontation involving Iran, Israel, Hezbollah, and Hamas, military operations are deeply intertwined with information warfare, proxy networks, psychological operations, and regional deterrence strategies. In parts of Africa, especially across the Sahel, hybrid forms of violence combine insurgency, foreign influence campaigns, mercenary networks, terrorism, and state fragility.

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Cognitive warfare, cyber pressure, disinformation, and economic coercion are no longer secondary instruments of conflict. They have become integral components of “grand strategy” pursued by state actors with regional and increasingly global ambitions. We are seeing a return to intense geopolitical rivalry, with states like Russia, China, and Iran competing for “cognitive dominance” over how people perceive reality. This challenges the old idea that the nation-state is declining in a globalized world. Instead, states are back at the center of politics, using cyber tools and economic measures alongside traditional military power.

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Traditional propaganda tries to persuade individuals. Cognitive warfare seeks to reshape how people interpret and evaluate information. It targets the underlying psychological processes through which individuals interpret and perceive reality. The objective is not merely to disseminate falsehoods but to erode trust in institutions and weaken social unity by exploiting political polarization, economic anxiety, and related societal tensions. This reflects a broader transformation of political conflict itself.

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In Taiwan, these operations aim to produce what some analysts describe as “information trauma.” Through sustained exposure to uncertainty, manipulation, and informational disruption, an adversary may weaken a democracy without direct military confrontation. I discuss these dynamics in my recent co-authored book, “Humans in the Cyber Loop: Perspectives on Social Cybersecurity” (Domalewska & Gasztold & Wrońska, Brill 2025). The publication examines how digital ecosystems shape political behavior and increase societal vulnerability to such tactics.

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The parallels [between Poland and Taiwan] are striking and, in many ways, deeply instructive. Both Poland and Taiwan operate under conditions of strategic asymmetry. Both must manage security against much larger neighbors without triggering a full-scale war. The methods are similar: Russia uses energy coercion and historical revisionism in Europe, while China uses economic pressure and “lawfare” in Asia.

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What is particularly revealing is that both regions experience similar patterns of hybrid interference, although adapted to different geopolitical and cultural contexts.

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The lesson from Ukraine and Taiwan is that modern war begins long before a border is crossed. It starts with the internal destabilization of society. One important element of this process is the promotion of isolationist narratives, particularly the claim that ‘the United States will abandon its allies.’ What is especially significant today is that such narratives no longer require external amplification alone. They are increasingly reinforced by domestic political rhetoric itself, including rhetoric associated with the current Trump administration.

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Taiwan shows us that democratic openness is actually a strategic asset. There is a tendency in Western security discourse to assume that effective crisis response requires centralized control. Very often, discussions of emergencies involve the temporary suspension of democratic norms in the name of security or stability. Taiwan demonstrates the opposite: democratic openness can function as a strategic asset rather than a vulnerability.

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What impressed me was Taiwan’s ability to maintain institutional coordination without sacrificing transparency. The government’s response to crises relies on extensive collaboration with civil society, independent media, and technical communities. This creates a kind of “distributed resilience”: multiple nodes of society capable of detecting, analyzing, and responding to threats without relying solely on state institutions. It is a model that suggests democracies do not need to choose between liberty and security. They can reinforce each other through inclusive, networked approaches to governance.

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What Taiwan has begun to demonstrate is that the solution lies not in restricting openness but in cultivating cognitive agility. The capacity of citizens to critically evaluate information, recognize manipulation attempts, and maintain trust in democratic institutions despite persistent influence campaigns. This requires investment in civic education, media literacy, and transparent communication from authorities.

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It also means accepting that complete defense against cognitive warfare is impossible. The goal is resilience rather than immunity. Democracies that recognize this paradox and build societal capacity to navigate it will be better positioned than those that attempt to seal themselves off.

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Ultimately, what Taiwan and Poland demonstrate together is that democratic resilience is not a static condition but a continuous practice – one that requires learning, adaptation, and solidarity across the global community of democracies facing similar pressures. The dialogue between our two societies, situated on different frontlines of the same struggle, represents precisely the kind of trans-regional cooperation that hybrid adversaries most fear.

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Archive Today link

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/53805063

Archived

Posts and headlines circulating online have accused EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas of calling China a “cancer” and making warmongering remarks about Russia and Beijing.

One widely shared post claimed that Kallas “just described China as a ‘disease’, specifically ‘cancer’”, whilst a headline from Brussels Signal read, “EU top diplomat Kaja Kallas calls China a ‘cancer'.”

Separate posts on X, one with millions of views, also attributed the quote “If Europe cannot defeat Russia, how then are we supposed to defeat China?” to the EU’s top diplomat.

But a closer examination of Kallas’ remarks shows that, while the comments could be considered controversial, some online users presented them sensationalised and out of context.

[...]

The first comment was made by Kallas on 17 May during the Lennart Meri Conference held in Estonia. The wide-ranging conversation looked at Europe’s response to China’s growing economic influence, industrial competition and trade practices.

During the exchange, the moderator argued that China was increasingly dominating industries, ranging from batteries and electric vehicles to industrial goods. He added he had not yet seen a "coherent European response to the China challenge."

Kallas replied that countries around the world were increasingly concerned about what she described as China's "coercive economic practices", before turning to a medical metaphor to refer to Europe's response.

“We have a very clear understanding of the diagnosis of the disease, but we don’t have agreement on the cure,” Kallas said.

She continued: “If you have a very, very difficult disease, like you have cancer, then you have two choices — either you increase the morphine or you start chemotherapy.”

Kallas later explained that “morphine” referred to subsidies helping European companies compete against Chinese imports, while “chemotherapy” referred to tougher EU measures that could trigger retaliation from Beijing.

So while critics interpreted the remarks as Kallas portraying China itself as the disease, the bloc’s foreign policy chief did not literally call China a “cancer”, with her comments forming part of a wider discussion about how Europe should respond to Chinese trade pressure and economic competition.

[...]

In separate viral posts, social media users also accused Kallas of “warmongering” by attributing the quote: “If Europe cannot defeat Russia, how then are we supposed to defeat China?” to her.

But a closer inspection of what Kallas said shows she did not use these words.

The comments are actually from a discussion hosted by the Hudson Institute on 27 February 2025, where Kallas discussed transatlantic relationships and the need for Europe to meet current geopolitical challenges with the institute's senior fellow, Peter Rough.

The full clip of the discussion shows Kallas argued that failing to effectively pressure Russia over its war in Ukraine could weaken Western credibility when signalling support to "Asian counterparts" in the event of a conflict involving China.

“China is so much bigger economy than Russia is with so much bigger military than Russia is. So if you’re saying that we collectively are not able to really pressure Russia so much that it would have an effect, then how do you say that you’re able to take on China risk?" Kallas said in the outdated clip presented as new footage.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/53784826

The EU and Germany both summoned Russian diplomats to protest attacks on Kyiv and orders for diplomats to leave the city. The UN secretary-general also rebuked Russia in a session on proliferating conflicts worldwide.

[...]

The EU, Germany, several UN members and Secretary-General Antonio Guterres all rebuked Russia on Tuesday for Sunday's bombardment of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv and Moscow's call for foreign diplomats to leave the city for their own safety.

Sunday's attack was one of the larger bombardments of Kyiv in the four-year Russian invasion. And on Monday, the Kremlin announced that it planned more such attacks that would "systematically" target what it said were defense companies and other military targets in the city.

[...]

Germany's Foreign Ministry said online that it had summoned Russia's ambassador and made clear "that we will not be intimidated by threats and will continue to support Ukraine wholeheartedly."

[...]

The spokeswoman for the EU's foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas said Russia's charge d'affaires was also called in in Brussels on Tuesday.

"Russia's threat to foreign citizens and diplomats to leave Kyiv is an unacceptable escalation," Anitta Hipper wrote. " [The EU] summoned the Charge d'Affaires, calling to stop hitting civilians and to engage in genuine peace talks."

She said the EU delegation would not be vacating its Kyiv offices.

[...]

Archived

The 10 pig heads are lying on the table. In the background, one can make out the pot of paint and brushes that had been used to scribble the word "Macron" on them in blue. A few hours later, on the night of September 8, 2025, the pig heads were placed in front of nine mosques and Muslim cultural centers in Paris and its inner suburbs, causing a media and political uproar that lasted for several days. By the end of that month, a sprawling police investigation led to the arrest of 11 people in Serbia and the conviction of three of them for acting on behalf of a Russian intelligence service.

[...]

Internal documents from the SDA [Social Design Agency, a firm active in the Kremlin's digital interference operations and already under Western sanctions] and its broader Russian ecosystem show that the authorities hoped to multiply such actions to the point of absurdity, sometimes devising convoluted plans. A preparatory note, titled "General – action plan," is a perfect example. Scheduled for late September 2024, the operation involved vandalizing the statue of General Charles de Gaulle on the Champs-Elysées in Paris, again with paint. The amateur painters were to pose as Ukrainian nationalists protesting Pierre de Gaulle, his grandson, known for his pro-Russian views. The plan was far-fetched, and made even more absurd by the suggested slogans, which included "Pierre de Gaulle, go back to your Russia!" and "Pierre de Gaulle, for heaven's sake!"

The planned vandals – three Serbs and three Kurds with Danish nationality – were also scheduled to be activated that same month for an operation aimed at launching about 30 inflatable sex dolls ("20 white, 10 black," according to the documents) and helium balloons painted with anti-immigrant slogans onto the Seine River. The entire scene would be filmed from a bridge in eastern Paris. In another project, also in the French capital, large numbers of stickers produced in Serbia and commemorating the Armenian genocide were to be plastered in April 2025 near the Turkish and Azerbaijani embassies.

[...]

...

According to [Finland’s ambassador to China, Mikko] Kinnunen, China’s perceived support for Russia’s war remains “the most problematic issue in Finnish-Chinese relations.”

The comments come shortly after Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen warned that China’s relationship with Russia could make future trade agreements between the EU and China more difficult.

...

According to Kinnunen, meetings between top political leaders carry particular importance in China, where high-level political relations play a bigger role than in many European countries.

Finland therefore still sees value in maintaining direct contact with China’s leadership – even as relations between Europe and China become increasingly strained over trade, security and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“It is important to have solid functioning relations so that you have a possibility to engage,” Kinnunen said.

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Web Archive link

The operation resulted in the seizure of approximately 800 servers and the arrest of two individuals, marking a major milestone in the fight against cyberattacks and digital disinformation campaigns.

[...]

The network, comprising several companies, included Stark Industries, WorkTitans/B.V., and Mirhosting, all of which are suspected of playing key roles in supporting cyberattacks and destabilization campaigns.

[...]

The European Union had previously imposed sanctions on certain entities connected to this network, but investigators found evidence that operations continued through a newly created Dutch entity, suspected of acting as a front company to bypass sanctions and regulatory controls.

FIOD conducted coordinated raids across multiple locations, seizing hundreds of servers, laptops, mobile phones, and extensive administrative records.

[...]

The case underscores the importance of modern cyberattacks relying not only on hacking tools and malicious software but also on highly organized hosting and networking infrastructure that operates across multiple jurisdictions.

[...]

Archived

A large-scale pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign is targeting Armenia ahead of its parliamentary elections on 7 June, researchers say.

In total, 343 fake videos were published by early May, prompting analysts to describe the operation as one of the most extensive in recent years — second only to the campaign observed during Moldova's 2025 election.

According to researchers, the campaign began in early March and was part of "Matryoshka" — a pro-Kremlin disinformation operation that has increasingly used artificial intelligence.

Among the fabricated videos, a central narrative claims that a victory for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, whose campaign focuses on a pro-European direction, could trigger a war between Armenia and Russia.

The collective Antibot4Navalny, which studies bot networks, said it had identified more than a dozen fake videos featuring Pashinyan and French President Emmanuel Macron, which repeatedly promote the false claim that the two leaders struck a "secret deal": French backing in the election in exchange for Armenia launching a war against Russia after a victory.

[...]The election campaign has unfolded against a backdrop of growing cooperation between the EU and Armenia, highlighted by the first EU–Armenia summit held in the country in early May.

The election campaign has unfolded against a backdrop of growing cooperation between the EU and Armenia, highlighted by the first EU–Armenia summit held in the country in early May.

[...]

Archived

[...]

In terms of media presence, one of the main instruments is China Radio International, which broadcasts news in Albanian. A lot of its content focuses on day-to-day developments in Albania, often drawing on sources like the Albanian Telegraphic Agency [Agjencia Telegrafike Shqiptare, known as ATA], the public broadcaster, or other local outlets.

Alongside that, it produces a significant amount of content about developments in China, as well as Chinese perspectives on global affairs. There is also the Xinhua News Agency, although it publishes in English and only occasionally in Albanian. In addition, there are a few local online media portals whose editorial line tends to align with Chinese narratives. It’s usually quite subtle; their day-to-day coverage focuses on Albania, but when it comes to international issues, the framing often reflects a more pro-Chinese stance.

[...]

A few years ago, a formal cooperation agreement was established with Albania’s public broadcaster to air documentaries on Chinese-Albanian relations, covering historical, economic and cultural ties. This drew some criticism at the time, as it was seen by some as using the public broadcaster as a platform for Chinese propaganda. As far as I’m aware, that agreement is still in place, with these documentaries continuing to be aired periodically.

[...]

Another important dimension is academic and cultural diplomacy. The Confucius Institute at the University of Tirana is a well-known example. It primarily functions as an educational and cultural centre, but it is also a soft power instrument. Beyond the Institute itself, there have been more recent efforts at the institutional level. For instance, the University of Tirana organised an official study visit to China aimed at strengthening academic cooperation. Private universities are also building cooperations in this regard.

[...]

[Albania] is not part of the Belt and Road Initiative, so the relationship is mostly based on trade – and it is quite imbalanced. That said, there have been some recent implicit political signals. Recent statements and public gestures by Prime Minister Edi Rama suggest a more visible openness toward engagement with China. This may also function as a subtle reminder to Western partners that Albania has other diplomatic and economic options, even while its formal strategic orientation remains EU accession and transatlantic cooperation. For example, quite recently, the Prime Minister invited a representative of the Chinese embassy, along with three Chinese students, onto his personal podcast to promote the Albanian translation of The New China Playbook. It received significant media attention, particularly because it was the Prime Minister himself promoting it.

[...]

Over time, this kind of exposure can contribute to a gradual normalisation of the Chinese political model as a legitimate alternative. And this is happening in a broader context where many citizens feel increasingly dissatisfied with the post-transition process. Expectations around democratic consolidation have not been fully met – or at least not as quickly as people had hoped. So for some, there is a sense that the transition has not delivered, whether economically, politically, or socially.

That tends to generate frustration and distrust toward public institutions, elections, and even the media itself. In that kind of environment, long-term exposure to these more subtle narratives about an alternative model can slowly start to shift perceptions. It is not direct or confrontational; it works gradually, by presenting the Chinese system as effective, stable, and successful. Over time, that can feed into the idea that a party-state model is a viable option.

[...]

There is also an impact on how democratic standards and values are understood. The EU accession process, for example, is not just about adopting laws but about embedding core values like human rights, rule of law, freedom of expression, and accountability. These are not framed in the same way within the Chinese model. And then, there is the technological dimension. We are increasingly seeing different models of digital governance, including when it comes to artificial intelligence. The EU tends to emphasise ethics, rights, and safeguards, while the Chinese model operates quite differently. Over time, exposure to these alternative narratives can subtly reshape how these values are perceived or prioritised.

[...]

A German married couple was arrested on suspicion of building contacts with ​German scientists to obtain intelligence on technologies ‌with possible military use for China, federal prosecutors said on Wednesday.

The couple, identified only as Xuejun C. and ​Hua S. in line with German ​privacy rules, are suspected of working for a ⁠Chinese intelligence agency and of seeking information on high-tech with ​military applications, prosecutors added.

...

The arrests, which took place ​on Wednesday, come as German authorities warn of growing security concerns from China.

Worried about technology transfer, the ​German government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who visited ​China in February, is seeking to "de-risk" economic ties. Beijing has ‌repeatedly ⁠denied accusations of espionage.

In the arrest warrant, the couple were accused of establishing contacts with scientists at German universities and research institutions, ​including professors ​in aerospace ⁠engineering, computer science, and AI.

They were also suspected of at times ​posing as interpreters or employees of ​an ⁠auto manufacturer, said prosecutors.

Some scientists were lured to China to give paid lectures to a civilian ⁠audience ​when in reality, representatives ​of state-owned defense companies were attending, prosecutors added.

[...]

As the German-language outlet Tagesschau reports,

German counterintelligence has been warning about Chinese espionage for many years, particularly with the aim of transferring innovations and information in the areas of technology and science to China. In May 2025, the Federal Prosecutor General indicted three German nationals before the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court who were said to have worked in Germany on behalf of the Chinese secret service. A married couple and a man are said to have run a company for this purpose in order to establish contact with companies and research institutions in Germany.

According to the Federal Prosecutor's Office, it was said to have involved innovative technologies that could be used for military purposes, in particular the further development of boat engines, sonar systems, aircraft protection systems, drives for armored vehicles and drones that could be used for military purposes. However, the espionage charge had to be dropped during the trial. The proceedings were continued due to alleged violations of foreign trade law and are ongoing.

China also spies in the political sphere. In April 2024, the Federal Prosecutor's Office arrested Jian G., an assistant to [Germany's right-wing party] AfD MEP Maximilian Krah. G. was accused of having been an employee of the Chinese secret service since 2002. When Krah entered the European Parliament in 2019, he is said to have transmitted information from parliamentary operations and about the AfD to the Chinese secret service. He is also said to have spied on Chinese opposition members and dissidents in Germany.

Six months after G.'s arrest, a Chinese national was arrested who worked for a logistics company at Leipzig/Halle Airport and is said to have sent G. information, for example, about the transport of military equipment or about flights of people from the German defense industry.

Both were sentenced to several years in prison; the verdicts are not yet final.

[...]