daveyOsborn

joined 11 months ago
 

cross-posted from: https://infosec.pub/post/51989792

from https://systemli.social/@anneroth/117228668085415636

“20,000 mail accounts. 20,000 blogs. 5,000 mailing lists. 1,500 websites.

In Europe.

Run by volunteers of @cavallette, perfectly legal, and decidedly antifascist, feminist, queer.

Destroyed and shut down by Trump's administration, extra legally.”

If you ever need to give a reason for refusing to use email, add this to the list of possible reasons.

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 2 points 3 days ago* (last edited 3 days ago) (1 children)

Indeed it is the most obnoxiously hostile act somewhere between bullying and license to kill bounty. I would like to know how the system works because certainly the US is not the only player.

Is it really a case where Trump can willy nilly list whoever he wants, and all allies are obligated to obey without question? Is there no mechanism by which Italy or the UN can say “hold on, we are not going to accept Trump tagging his political adversaries as terrorists and then lick boots unconditionally”? Anti-terror policy is losing legitimacy with every abuse of it, including Trump’s assassination of drug dealers under the abusive claim of “narco-terrorism”.

 

cross-posted from: https://infosec.pub/post/51989792

from https://systemli.social/@anneroth/117228668085415636

“20,000 mail accounts. 20,000 blogs. 5,000 mailing lists. 1,500 websites.

In Europe.

Run by volunteers of @cavallette, perfectly legal, and decidedly antifascist, feminist, queer.

Destroyed and shut down by Trump's administration, extra legally.”

 

from https://systemli.social/@anneroth/117228668085415636

“20,000 mail accounts. 20,000 blogs. 5,000 mailing lists. 1,500 websites.

In Europe.

Run by volunteers of @cavallette, perfectly legal, and decidedly antifascist, feminist, queer.

Destroyed and shut down by Trump's administration, extra legally.”

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 1 points 4 days ago* (last edited 4 days ago)

In principle, yes. But FWIW, here’s a good example of doing it poorly:

https://sopuli.xyz/post/45724372

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 1 points 5 days ago* (last edited 5 days ago)

Saw this in the article:

This is the biggest drawback of hidden SSIDs. When a network is hidden, your phone or laptop has to constantly shout, "Are you there, [Hidden Home Network]?" everywhere you go.

There is a paper that describes how an iOS device listens to everyone else’s phones as they broadcast all the SSIDs they connect to (regardless of where the two phones intersect). It gave the impression that phones also reveal non-hidden SSIDs when looking to connect, as it’s uncommon for people to have hidden SSIDs.

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 1 points 6 days ago

It’s a handle that is broadcasted from your wi-fi router, if you have one. It enables your phone or laptop to distinguish your network from your neighbors.

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 1 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago) (1 children)

I lost the link but the research was done by: Douglas J. Leith, School of Computer Science & Statistics, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland, 25th March, 2021 in a paper titled “Mobile Handset Privacy: Measuring The Data iOS and Android Send to Apple And Google”.

Every Android device owner is a Google spy. Every iOS device owner is an Apple spy. They don’t know it, generally. Android and iOS devices ~~constantly~~¹ harvest the radio data of their surroundings and they send the data home to their respective mothership. This is hard-wired into the platforms and has nothing todo with accounts. An arbitrary person randomly walks/drives by your house with their iPhone or android powered on, and it collects your SSID, MAC, GPS position, etc and sends it to Google or Apple, unwittingly, because people are oblivious as to what’s going on.

¹ The phone user may need to have location services enabled for the phoning-home to occur.. not sure if turning on location services enables the data sharing in both directions or just one. Guess I need to re-read the research.

 

From the article:

“it appears to be siphoning images collected by a widely-used identity verification company based in Louisiana.”

Worth noting that 5 US states (e.g. Florida) have stopped issuing standard drivers licenses and effectively force their residents to obtain a “Real ID” which includes additional data -- which of course makes more sensitive data available to cybercriminals.

(edit) BTW, would be useful to have a free-world venue for posts just about data breaches. Proposal here.

Update: Source of the leak revealed

The IDScan verification giant got breached

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 1 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago)

I’m glad that opting out is available, but there is no practical, technical enforcement.

What sort of technologically-enforced mechanism might you envision that does not rely on legal enforcement?

Lately I practice the only tech-enforced option I know of: wholly pull the plug on wi-fi. Indeed, this means I only have ethernet in my house and wifi radios are disabled. It also means for my smartphone to reach the cloud, I am reverse tethering over USB. Try getting a crowd of people to do that. I will praise you if you can get 10 people to do that.

There is such a thing as bluetooth routers. So a middle ground would be to pull the plug on wi-fi and use bluetooth instead. Though it’s a compromise because we cannot¹ be certain that Google does not also harvest bluetooth. But at least the limited range would mean fewer cases where the signal reaches the street. Of course you would have to be okay with the slower speed.

If Google violates their own policy, it’s legally actionable. So if you are going to run wi-fi you can do your part in helping grow the legal liability that Google has signed up for. I see no good excuse for not appending _nomap to the end of your SSID. It’s just pure lazyness not to.

¹ well strictly speaking, we might know from the location data whether Google uses bluetooth. But if it’s not part of the location data it would not be an absolute indicator that it’s not collected.

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 4 points 1 week ago (3 children)

It has nothing to do with your phone. If you have wi-fi at home and the wireless signal reaches the road, then it’s relevant.

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 4 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago)

They are microprocessors embedded within the microprocessor. Intel’s IME enables remote access (by intel’s own admission). If you are not a corporation who manages a fleet of machines, the backdoor can only be used against you. AMD’s variant called the PSP is similar but closed-source. We don’t really have a complete picture of the extent of the compromise with AMD because of the opacity of it (as AMD proactively denied a request for source code). What we don’t know /can/ hurt us, as we already got stung by a defective driver for the AMD’s PSP.

Even if the spychips were to be hypothetically designed to be aligned with the interests of non-corporate individual consumers, there is no such thing as bug-free software. They have added complexity that works against us and brings vulnerabilities. And we also cannot dispense of the deliberate design whereby some remote actor decides for the user what software is or is not “authorised” to execute. I alone should decide what is authorised on my PC.

So the fix is to use an AMD processor made before ~2014 (roughly speaking), or a pre-2009 intel. AMD chips were behind intel in terms of performance, but probably not 5 years behind. So I figure 2013 AMDs are the most interesting. But we only have a fuzzy idea of which AMD chips are spychip-free.

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 1 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago) (1 children)

Well, @passenger@sopuli.xyz mentioned that it’s on the google page. But then when I chose some of the brands under “Find specific steps for your access point”, it’s a bit useless because manufacturers web admins have no sense of discipline or self-control. They cannot resist the urge to rearrange their website which broke Google’s links. But further below on Google’s page are some general instructions. I would try to follow those. And if you get stuck, maybe try posting a support request in !homenetworking@selfhosted.forum.

(update) I just had a closer look at the general instructions to do a quick sanity check. Google’s instructions for linux are bad at the 2nd step. That is, running ifconfig as a linux user can be tricky.. might need to run /sbin/ifconfig instead. And even if it runs, it does not give the gateway anyway.

If you’re on linux, run ip route instead, which will say something like default via 192.168.1.1. Whatever IP address is the default gateway, that is what you need for the next step. Note I am only talking about linux. Google’s instructions are probably fine for other platforms.

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 3 points 1 week ago

What I would expect to happen is when an AOS or iOS device falls in your range in the future, it will not report the AP to the mothership. But the motherships will still remember the history and perhaps be able to continue exploiting it. To have more certainty, I would change the MAC address on the AP if it lets you, and perhaps also change the prefix of the SSID for good measure. If your AP gives no means for changing the MAC, you could investigate replacing the firmware with openwrt -- but probably not worth the effort just to change the MAC.

When I setup an AP, I chose the same SSID as a neighbor but then added the suffix for fun.. to confuse things. Then they changed their SSID (perhaps in fear that something dodgy was going on).

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 10 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago)

Apple seems to say hiding your SSID will not protect you:

“This opt-out doesn't work for hidden networks because they make their network name available only to known devices, so other devices can't detect "_nomap."”

So IIUC, if you hide your SSID and an Apple spy (read: normal iOS user) connects to it, their device will ignore the _nomap token and report your AP to the mothership. And note as well that a hidden SSID only makes your AP invisible in the absence of traffic. iOS devices can probably see and process traffic that happens to be in motion when they are in range.

[–] daveyOsborn@infosec.pub 2 points 1 week ago (2 children)

Glad to hear Apple has aligned with Google on that.

 

cross-posted from: https://infosec.pub/post/51680197

Append “_nomap” to the end of your SSIDs to instruct Google not to use your wi-fi access point for their mapping services.

~~To do the same for Apple, add “_optout” to the end of your SSIDs¹.~~

To boycott both, the rumor is that Google’s “_nomap” must be last, but Apple’s “_optout” flag must be in the penultimate position if and only if Google’s token is at the end. So you might have an SSID like “boycottCloudflare_optout_nomap” to boycott the baddies, for example. But note that “boycottCloudflare” is merely symbolic, to raise awareness of the web’s most harmful enshitifier.

¹ sorry to say I have no reference to cite for the Apple rules. It’s just a rumor.

update

The Apple opt-out procedure has apparently changed to align with Google. Someone refers to this page for Apple.

update 2

Mapquest is suddenly gaining popularity.

 

Append “_nomap” to the end of your SSIDs to instruct Google not to use your wi-fi access point for their mapping services.

~~To do the same for Apple, add “_optout” to the end of your SSIDs¹.~~

To boycott both, the rumor is that Google’s “_nomap” must be last, but Apple’s “_optout” flag must be in the penultimate position if and only if Google’s token is at the end. So you might have an SSID like “boycottCloudflare_optout_nomap” to boycott the baddies, for example. But note that “boycottCloudflare” is merely symbolic, to raise awareness of the web’s most harmful enshitifier.

¹ sorry to say I have no reference to cite for the Apple rules. It’s just a rumor.

update

The Apple opt-out procedure has apparently changed to align with Google. Someone refers to this page for Apple.

update 2

Mapquest is suddenly gaining popularity.

 

No privacy orgs have bothered to test and publish AMD CPUs that were made in 2013 which were not compromised by AMD’s PSP. This means if you want to avoid the spychip, you’re compelled to undertake a project of sorting through guesswork, heresay, and vague documents. AMD only vaguely identifies some microarchitectures that have the PSP. There is conflicting information about whether the Kaveri APUs have spychips.

And from there, even if you have a concrete list of chips, laptop and desktop manufacturers have scrubbed their websites of useful specs of that time period because they only want you to buy their new products. So it’s hard to know which machines have the precious resource of a trustworthy CPU.

If a privacy org or FOSS org were to investigate and publish lists of spychip-free processors and also lists of devices that contained those chips (perhaps in collaboration with an eco org like Greenpeace), it would drive up demand for machines that are being discarded for being “too old”. It would inspire some consumers to acquire or hang on to used machines rather than buy something newly enshitified.

 

cross-posted from: https://infosec.pub/post/51597625

The linked list of AMD processors is mobile 3D APUs under codename “Kaveri”. It is well documented that the successor to Steamroller marked the introduction of the PSP. But there is no concrete statement about which chips were the first to have the PSP. Wikipedia states the linked group of APUs have:

  • Integrated custom ARM Cortex-A5 co-processor[47] with TrustZone Security Extensions[48]

The footnote does not support the claim. Can anyone confirm or deny whether Kaveri mobile chips have a PSP?

 

The linked list of AMD processors is mobile 3D APUs under codename “Kaveri”. It is well documented that the successor to Steamroller marked the introduction of the PSP. But there is no concrete statement about which chips were the first to have the PSP. Wikipedia states the linked group of APUs have:

  • Integrated custom ARM Cortex-A5 co-processor[47] with TrustZone Security Extensions[48]

The footnote does not support the claim. Can anyone confirm or deny whether Kaveri mobile chips have a PSP?

 

I bought a Lenovo laptop charger with USB-C connector. There was no mention of USB PD but the label listed voltages (5v, 9v, 12v, 15v, 20v), which encourages us to guess that it may possibly be USB-PD (what else?). But since there is no incentive for Lenovo to disclose whether it’s USB-PD compliant, it chooses to minimise its legal liability and write nothing about USB-PD (as most PSUs do, even aftermarket ones).

Since I bought the PSU from a dodgy street market where people sell dumpster-dive products, I needed to quickly test it. I attached it to a simple USB-C bicycle light which has an LED to indicate charging. It did not charge. So it appeared the Lenovo PSU was dead. I tossed it into a box of e-waste to decide later whether to repair, harvest parts from, or dispose of.

Some manufacturers apparently believe when the USB-PD standard says “5v is the default”, it means 5v should be delivered in the absence of a handshake. Other engineers have interpretted “default” to mean both sides of the negotiation should conform to 5v /if/ the handshake negotiation yields nothing higher -- but that a handshake is strictly required nonetheless. No handshake → no power.

Couple that discrepency of USB-PD interpretation with the fact that manufacturers resist claiming to conform to USB-PD anyway (as the law does not demand it and consumers don’t either), we have a recipe for disaster. I am sure a lot of functional USB-PD devices will be thrown away because of this kind of shit that I encountered. Perhaps the Lenovo PSU I have was already in a dumpster and fished out by whoever sold it to me.

I almost tossed the Lenovo PSU but decided to try powering a 9v device with it, and it worked. I almost didn’t do the experiment because I originally thought if it cannot power a 5v bicycle light it’s probably dead.

Worth mentioning this thread which shows how consumers are blindly overrating USB-PD unaware of the pitfalls.

 

The FCC has not figured out how to properly secure their website, so they have bluntly made their website access-restricted to arbitrarily exclude whole demographics of people. They lack the competency to transparently state /who/ they are blocking and who they are allowing, but tests show they have certainly not figured out how to serve the Tor community.

Setting aside those embarrassing facts about a fed’s communication agency failing to communicate with people, we should in the very least be able to reach FCC content on archive.org (who demonstrates competency in handling Tor traffic). But when visiting a recent FCC page on archive.org, such as this, it redirects to fcc.gov! There are perhaps some malicious JavaScript shenanigans going on because an old page like this does not attempt to deny people access to archives.

Why the FCC wants to attack people’s access to archive.org is unclear. But the bottom line is archive.org is our refuge for copious forms of enshitification. So when a kind of enshitification directly attacks ppls access to archive.org, it needs a spotlight.

(update) Legally speaking, isn’t it the FCC who we would expect to take enforcement action against a denial of service attack like this? What’s the recourse when the FCC /is/ the attacker?

Legal thread here.

 

A DAB/Internet radio (made by Karcher in Germany) broadcasts an SSID (details). It cannot be disabled and neither the SSID nor the MAC address can be changed.

Can someone explain why this is necessary?

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