squalless

bro just peg a new stablecoin to it if it's so liquid...

I guess my view on that section is still that it's just an example of what can happen and why to reserve the right to suppression, but not a threshold or reasonable scenario for when to apply suppression.

for it may easily turn out that..

To me, this really isn't saying: "this is one case where it's reasonable to apply suppression", but rather more simply: "because the following may easily occur with intolerant philosophies".

Anyway, I appreciate you taking the time to reply and expand more on your take. I think let's just say we understand it differently and leave it at that?

Thanks for clarifying the quote's source etc.

I still kindly disagree with this understanding of the language though.

To me that whole section is justification for why to reserve the right to suppression: because the intolerant may not engage with argument in good faith, and they may instead tell their followers to denounce logical argument altogether and be violent.

The key word here is may, which to me means "this might happen". I basically read this as a warning of a potential outcome of intolerant philosophies - and why suppression might be needed and why to reserve the right to it - but not a threshold for when to suppress them.

But, at this point it seems like we might just have to agree to disagree on the meaning of the quote!

And once again, none of this is my opinion on the topic itself and I'm not endorsing a position, I'm only offering my understanding of the quote.

I've re-read it and still kindly and respectfully disagree about the meaning of that excerpt in isolation. Whatever the implications of this interpretation are, I have no idea because I'm not familiar with the work (however naïvely).

Here's a detailed breakdown of my take:

I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies;

The key word here is always, so, intolerant philosophies shouldn't always be suppressed.

as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise.

The condition for not suppressing intolerant philosophies is if they can be kept in check and countered by public opinion and rational argument.

But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force;

Reserve the right to suppression if necessary..

for it may easily turn out that

Because the following things might easily happen:

they [the intolerant] are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols.

An example of what may occur when the first approach fails due to essentially bad faith, and the reasoning for why to reserve the right to suppression. But it doesn't frame violence as the threshold for when to apply that suppression.

Anyway, that's my take. I'm still assuming this quote is accurate - I haven't checked it.

And once again I'm absolutely not agreeing with these positions or assertions about the suppression of intolerance, this is just how I understand the text.

I disagree with this assessment of the text - assuming it's correct, I'm not familiar with the source.

What this extract is saying imo is as long as it's possible to effectively keep in check and counter intolerance with argument and public opinion, suppression is unwise.

But, tolerance should reserve the right to suppress intolerance before it becomes violent, specifically when intolerance acts in bad faith and refuses to participate in logical argument or debate, and instead denounces argument entirely.

So the threshold is not violence itself, but one example of what "may" lead to violence.

Just my 2¢ on the text (not my opinion on the topic).