cross-posted from: https://lemmygrad.ml/post/13046279

What is Tacheng, Xinjiang really like?

After exploring Urumqi and the surrounding region, I travelled further northwest to Tacheng, right on China’s border with Kazakhstan, to see another side of Xinjiang for myself. Tacheng is one of the most culturally diverse parts of Xinjiang, home to communities including Kazakh, Tatar, Russian, Uyghur, Hui and Han Chinese. In this video, I explore local villages, schools, traditional food, farming, livestock, ethnic culture and the everyday lives of people living in this remote corner of western China.

Along the way, I visit a massive high-yield corn farming area, learn about Bashibai sheep, see how local sour plum drinks are produced, experience Tatar traditions, visit Tacheng No. 2 Primary School, and explore Aketikeqie Village.

Xinjiang is often portrayed in Western media as one of the most controversial and restricted regions in China. But what does it actually look like when you travel there yourself?

Rather than relying only on headlines, I wanted to come here, walk the streets, meet local people and see Tacheng with my own eyes.

Come with me to one of the most fascinating and rarely seen corners of China.

In an exclusive interview conducted by The Cradle, a senior Lebanese army officer discusses the military institution’s limits in the Hezbollah weapons file, tensions between Yarzeh and Baabda, and US influence extending from military bases and training to decisions over the army’s weapons.

As pressure mounts to disarm Hezbollah, while Israel continues its near-daily strikes on Lebanon and maintains its occupation of positions inside Lebanese territory, the Lebanese army faces an increasingly complex equation. It is expected to implement the decisions of the political authorities without being drawn into an internal confrontation, while sitting across the table from Israeli officers as part of the “mechanism committee.” At the same time, the army relies heavily on the US for its weapons and training, while Washington guarantees Israel’s qualitative military superiority.

In this interview, a senior officer in the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), speaking on condition of anonymity, outlines the limits of the military institution’s role in the weapons file and discusses tensions between LAF Commander General Rudolphe Haikal and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun. He also reveals the presence of US military personnel at the Hamat and Rayak bases, as well as what he describes as a “strike force” within the army that, he says, receives its orders directly from the Americans.

Behind all of this lies a question the officer raises bluntly: How can an army that does not control its own weapons procurement, and whose soldiers earn $300 a month, be expected to bear sole responsibility for defending Lebanon?

The Cradle: How does the Lebanese army deal with mounting demands and pressure to disarm Hezbollah? Where does it draw the limits of its role on this issue, between implementing the decisions of the political authorities and preserving civil peace and internal stability?

A: The Lebanese army is not the institution that makes the political decision on disarming Hezbollah. This is a sovereign and political matter decided by the state through its constitutional institutions. The army’s role is to implement the decisions of the legitimate authorities within the framework of the constitution and the law. In other words, it is not the army that decides whether Hezbollah’s weapons will be disarmed, nor when or how this will happen.

I know the next question will be: What will the army do if a political decision is taken on this matter?

This is where the issue becomes more complicated. The army is obliged to implement whatever it is tasked with by the political authorities. But the military institution also considers the consequences of any decision on the ground, as well as its impact on civil peace, the unity of the army, and internal stability. There is a major difference between taking a political decision and having the ability to implement it on the ground. The army does not want to become a party to an internal confrontation, nor does it want to be pushed into a confrontation with a segment of the Lebanese population, because one of its core priorities is to prevent strife and preserve the unity of the military institution itself.

This also explains the extreme caution with which the army approaches this issue. The army’s experience during the civil war, and the damage suffered by the institution at the time, have made the issue of its internal unity particularly sensitive.

Therefore, any decision of this kind requires broad political and national support, as well as an implementable mechanism that does not lead to internal fighting. If a political decision is issued and the army is then asked to enforce it by force, while implementation threatens civil peace or places the army in a broad internal confrontation, this would be an extremely dangerous equation. As for disarming Hezbollah across Lebanese territory specifically, the army will not implement a decision by the political authorities unless there is consensus, in order to safeguard the unity of the institution.

In this sense, the state can take a decision on paper. But if the political and national conditions required to implement it without threatening civil peace are not in place, that decision may remain nothing more than ink on paper.

The Cradle: Does Army Commander General Rudolphe Haikal make decisions unilaterally within the institution, with officers following his lead, or do the views of senior officers carry weight in the decision-making process?

A: If the question is whether General Haikal could decide to disarm Hezbollah, that is not a decision for the army commander to make, but a political decision for the state. As for the views of officers, there is, of course, a military command structure and a chain of command. Sensitive decisions are discussed among senior officers, and assessments are carefully considered. Their primary role in such matters concerns operational timing, risk assessment, and the army’s ability to carry out a decision.

There are also different political currents within the institution. While all officers ultimately answer to the commander, they have their own views, just as the commander has his. The degree of cooperation between officers and the leadership can vary depending on how closely their political convictions align or diverge.

A matter as significant as disarming Hezbollah, however, directly affects civil peace, Lebanon’s national security, and the country’s stability. General Haikal has repeatedly stated that protecting civil peace is a red line that cannot be compromised.

The Cradle: Given his position at the head of the army, has General Rudolphe Haikal faced attempts by the political authorities, particularly President Joseph Aoun, to undermine or weaken him? If so, how?

A: I do not think the issue can simply be described as an attempt by President Joseph Aoun to undermine General Haikal. There is, however, clear room for tension between political and military considerations. As head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces under the constitution, the president has political and security priorities, as well as international commitments. The army commander, by contrast, is responsible for assessing what the army can actually carry out on the ground and what risks that may entail.

This tension emerges when there is a political desire to push the army toward faster or more sensitive steps, while the military leadership believes that implementation requires different conditions, could expose the army to an internal confrontation, or threaten its cohesion. In such circumstances, the army commander may feel that his operational decision-making is coming under pressure.

The tension between the commander and President Aoun is, in fact, real. The threat by the Americans to remove the army commander is evidence of this.

But claiming that Joseph Aoun deliberately seeks to weaken Haikal or circumvent his authority within the army would require evidence. Such evidence could include direct communication with officers while bypassing the army commander, interference in appointments and promotions to build networks of loyalty to the president within the institution, or pressure to reverse operational decisions taken by Haikal. None of this has occurred, while it should also be recalled that Joseph Aoun was the one who appointed Rudolphe Haikal as army commander.

The Cradle: The Lebanese army now sits in the same room with the Israelis. To what extent does it feel comfortable or uncomfortable with this? And can you give us an idea of what takes place inside that room?

A: The Lebanese army is not comfortable with this arrangement at all. Its presence in the same room with the Israelis does not mean there is trust between the two sides, nor does it mean that there is any normal relationship between them. For the army, this is a forced arrangement for dealing with a military and security reality that has been imposed on it.

More importantly, the army’s experience with the Israeli side over the past several months has given it a very clear assessment. It is difficult to reach stable understandings with the Israelis, or to rely on their adherence to what has been agreed upon, as Israeli violations and operations continue.

The army enters that room as a representative of the Lebanese state, tasked with a specific mission involving security coordination through the “mechanism committee,” not on the basis of considering the Israelis a partner it trusts. If you want to sum up the mood within the military institution, there is a great deal of distrust, and perhaps a growing conviction that reaching an agreement with Israel is one thing, while ensuring that it is implemented on the ground is something else entirely.

The Cradle: We know that the Lebanese army relies, in part, on intelligence and technical capabilities based on software and systems provided or supported by western countries. Does this raise concerns about Lebanon’s intelligence sovereignty? And to what extent can the army ensure that information relating to Lebanese citizens and activities inside Lebanon remains under its exclusive control, without outside parties gaining access to or exploiting it?

A: This is certainly a source of concern, and the issue is not limited to the Lebanese army. Any security institution that relies on foreign intelligence technology faces a fundamental question about the security of its information: Who owns the system? Who can access the data? Where is it stored? Are there backdoors or technical capabilities that the user does not know about?

In Lebanon’s case, the sensitivity is greater because of the army’s reliance on western aid, equipment, and training, particularly from the US. But a distinction must be made between having western systems or software and saying that the countries that developed them can automatically access the army’s intelligence. I do not believe that is the case. Nevertheless, the concern remains legitimate, particularly in a country like Lebanon. The army operates in a highly sensitive intelligence environment, while Israel possesses highly advanced technical and intelligence capabilities and maintains close security ties with the US and western countries.

The basic principle is that any technology you receive from abroad – and this applies beyond the army as well – comes with limits to your ability to protect it, because you did not develop it yourself.

For the Lebanese army, the key issue is therefore maintaining control over the security of its data. Sensitive databases must remain within systems under its full control, and the army must have a clear understanding of how the software it uses operates and who has access to it.

In intelligence work, without full control over your data and the technology used to process it, there will always be a question mark over the independence of your decision-making and the extent of your intelligence sovereignty.

The Cradle: Is there a US military base in Lebanon?

A: Officially, there is no declared US military base in Lebanon. Even when the issue of Hamat Air Base was raised recently, the Lebanese Ministry of Defense explicitly denied that it was an American base, stressing that it is a Lebanese air base under the exclusive authority of the Lebanese army.

But this official answer does not tell the whole story. Americans are in fact present at Hamat Air Base, which has been covered by the media on several occasions. They are also present at Rayak Air Base, where they oversee the drone operations facility, while a surveillance system covering the Masnaa area is located at the heart of Rayak.

The US military and security presence and influence in Lebanon are exceptional. They are accompanied by a very high level of cooperation and coordination between the Lebanese and US armies, including the presence of US military personnel, joint exercises, regular visits by US Central Command (CENTCOM) officials, and the arrival of US military aircraft in Lebanon. US training teams are also deployed with all special forces units. The Lebanese army itself has, on various occasions, announced the arrival of US military aircraft and teams for training missions, as well as the participation of US military personnel in exercises inside Lebanon.

There are also serious questions about the limits of Lebanese sovereignty in dealing with this presence. Over the years, questions have been raised about the special facilities and exceptional procedures afforded to the US mission and the movement of US military personnel.

Information in circulation indicates that US military aircraft arriving in Lebanon do not, in practice, undergo the standard inspection procedures applied to regular flights at Beirut airport. It also indicates that the identities and baggage of some passengers arriving on these aircraft are checked under special arrangements.

The new US embassy compound in Awkar is also not a conventional diplomatic mission, neither in terms of its size nor its security infrastructure. It is a huge, heavily fortified compound with extensive security and logistical infrastructure. If we are to speak seriously about Lebanese sovereignty, there is a real question here: Does the Lebanese state have specific mechanisms for monitoring the people entering and leaving under these arrangements? And what are the limits of the immunity and security arrangements granted to the mission?

The area around the US embassy in Awkar has also witnessed several incidents involving the movement of armed US personnel outside the embassy compound and questions over the limits of their authority on Lebanese territory. Diplomatic protection is one thing; armed foreign personnel exercising security powers on Lebanese soil is something else entirely.

Here I would like to recall what happened at Hamat in February of this year, when armed US personnel blocked the road and prevented residents from reaching their homes, in the absence of the Lebanese army. They also prevented the mayor from approaching them and ordered him to leave, while refusing his demand that they leave. The incident caused a major uproar at the time, because the US soldiers also ordered Lebanese army soldiers to withdraw immediately, which constituted an unacceptable affront.

The issue is not limited to the military dimension. The US ambassador to Lebanon has historically enjoyed a very broad scope for direct communication with the highest political, military, security, and judicial levels. When it becomes commonplace for a foreign ambassador to visit senior judicial officials, including the prosecutor general at the Court of Cassation, this naturally raises questions about where the line is drawn between legitimate diplomatic engagement and political influence over institutions that are supposed to enjoy full independence.

The Cradle: How many US military personnel are currently in Lebanon?

A: I do not have a specific figure. The number should be known to the Ministry of Defense, Army Command, and Lebanese General Security. But the latest official figure announced by the White House was 99 US military personnel, in a report submitted to Congress in 2024. I personally believe the number is higher today.

The Cradle: When Joseph Aoun was army commander, we saw him in photographs with former US ambassador Dorothy Shea more often than we saw him without her. How does the US embassy communicate with the Lebanese army? And what is the nature of the channels of communication between them?

A: The relationship between the US embassy and the Lebanese Army Command does not resemble a conventional diplomatic relationship between an embassy and a military institution. There are near-permanent direct channels of communication, starting with the US ambassador, the military attachés, and the embassy’s Office of Defense Cooperation, and extending directly to CENTCOM.

During Joseph Aoun’s tenure as army commander, for example, Dorothy Shea met with him frequently, sometimes accompanied by the military attaché or senior US military commanders. Commanders from CENTCOM and its naval and air forces visited Yarzeh and met directly with the army commander. In the other direction, Aoun visited Washington and met with officials at the Pentagon, the State Department, the National Security Council, and Congress, with the US ambassador taking part in a number of these meetings. All of this is documented and publicly known.

But the relationship goes beyond meetings. The US is the Lebanese army’s primary external security partner and has spent heavily on supporting it. It provides the army with weapons, trains our officers and personnel, and supplies aircraft, helicopters, ammunition, vehicles, and communications systems, while also contributing to the development of its capabilities and military institutions. Thousands of Lebanese military personnel have received US training, including officers who have gone on to hold senior command positions, one of whom became president of the republic.

There is also an institutional mechanism for this coordination. In 2021, for example, the two sides held an official Defense Resources Conference attended by Joseph Aoun, Dorothy Shea, and officials from the US Departments of Defense and State. Notably, the conference was not limited to discussing immediate aid. The two sides also agreed to intensify military coordination and develop a five-year plan to strengthen the army’s capabilities according to priorities agreed upon by both sides.

At times, the communication extends to highly sensitive operational and political matters. During the 2017 Fajr al-Jurd (Dawn of the Outskirts) battle, there was direct contact between the commander of CENTCOM and army commander Joseph Aoun. Washington was particularly concerned with the issue of coordination between the Lebanese army on the one hand, and Hezbollah and the Syrian Army on the other.

We are dealing with a deep military relationship that has accumulated over many years. It encompasses funding, weapons, training, planning, direct communication with the army commander, direct ties with CENTCOM and the Pentagon, as well as ongoing political communication with the embassy.

This, naturally, gives the US considerable influence in its relationship with the military institution. Even Washington itself describes the Lebanese army as a key security partner and explicitly says that its investment in training and equipping the army has yielded significant gains for US interests in Lebanon and the region.

The Cradle: Do the Americans communicate directly with Army Commander General Rudolphe Haikal, or do they bypass him and deal with other officers and generals in the army?

A: The Americans’ relationship with the Lebanese army does not pass exclusively through the army commander. There is a broad network of direct relationships between Americans and Lebanese officers at different levels, built over many years of cooperation, training, and military assistance. There are also officers in the Lebanese army who communicate with US officers through various programs, training exercises, and joint missions.

The Cradle: Which generals in the Lebanese army are considered to be closest to the US embassy?

A: The leading figure for the Americans at present is Brigadier General George Saqr, director of planning.

The Cradle: Where does the Lebanese army obtain its weapons and equipment? Can you give us specific figures and information? What is the value of this assistance, and what types of weapons does it receive?

A: The US has been the Lebanese army’s primary source of arms and equipment over the past two decades. The army also receives assistance and equipment from other countries, including France, Britain, Qatar, Jordan, and other European states, and occasionally purchases weapons directly from other sources. But since 2006, US assistance has formed the backbone of the army’s foreign military support.

The figures give a clear sense of the scale of this relationship. Between 2006 and 2018 alone, US military assistance to the Lebanese army amounted to around $1.28 billion, with annual support ranging in some years from $120 million to $180 million.

This is not money that the army receives and then spends as it sees fit. A central part of the system involves allocating US funds to the Lebanese army, after which its weapons and equipment requirements are identified from among the items the US agrees to finance, with the US Department of Defense paying the manufacturers. Washington therefore does not merely finance the army’s arms procurement; through these programs, it also has considerable influence over the types of weapons the army can obtain.

The weapons and equipment the army has actually received through US assistance programs are also well documented. By 2019, these included 12 Huey II helicopters, 13 Cessna aircraft, Hellfire missiles, M712 Copperhead guided artillery shells, unmanned aerial systems, armored vehicles, and anti-tank missiles. The Lebanese Navy also received 26 fast interceptor boats.

The army’s reliance on US assistance does not mean that all of its weapons come from the US. It also retains an arsenal of weapons from eastern sources acquired during earlier periods, and has purchased weapons and ammunition from other countries. In 2017, for example, the Ministry of Defense signed a contract with a Serbian company to purchase 2,000 Grad rockets, each 122mm in caliber, for around $3.3 million.

There was also a major attempt to diversify the army’s sources of weapons through Saudi Arabia and France, in the form of a $3 billion French arms deal for the army financed by Saudi Arabia. At an earlier stage, Russia also offered Lebanon MiG-29 fighter aircraft, but the US opposed Lebanon acquiring them and worked politically to prevent the donation from going through.

US support gives Washington considerable leverage over the types of weapons the Lebanese army is permitted to acquire. The case of Cobra helicopters proposed for the army through Jordan is one example. The project faced objections at the time linked to the US and Israeli positions, and the helicopters were never delivered. At the same time, the flow of US equipment designed primarily for counterterrorism, border control, reconnaissance, close air support, and internal security continued.

This influence extends beyond the type of weapon to how it is used. The term “End User” means that anything you receive from the Americans comes with conditions on its use, and there is always someone “behind the tree.”

The Cradle: What does the Lebanese army need in order to direct its military capabilities toward confronting the Israeli enemy? And why is it unable to obtain these capabilities and weapons?

A: The fundamental problem is that the Lebanese army has not been built or armed over the past decades to fight a conventional war with Israel. Most western assistance, particularly from the US, has focused on counterterrorism, border control, internal security, reconnaissance, transport, and logistical support.

If we want the army to become a genuine deterrent force against Israel, we are talking about an entirely different system. It needs air defenses capable of dealing with aircraft and drones, radars and early-warning systems, electronic warfare capabilities, artillery and long-range precision missiles, advanced anti-tank weapons, and naval capabilities to protect the coast. Above all, it needs a command-and-control and intelligence system capable of linking these weapons together.

The Lebanese army currently has no combat-capable air force capable of confronting the Israeli Air Force, nor does it have a modern air defense network capable of denying Israeli aircraft freedom of action in Lebanese airspace. This is a massive gap: you cannot seriously talk about defending Lebanon while your adversary operates in Lebanese airspace with near-total superiority.

Why does the army not receive these weapons? There are two reasons.

The first is financial and political, on the Lebanese side. Building an army capable of fighting a conventional war requires billions of dollars, a defense strategy, and a sustainable military budget. The Lebanese state is bankrupt and does not have the resources to provide this, while the army has become heavily dependent on foreign assistance to develop its capabilities.

It is enough to look at the fact that a soldier’s salary is $300, as US envoy Tom Barrack himself said. This is a conspiracy in which all sides are complicit against the army, because it is impossible to build military readiness on salaries like these. The army today operates as though it were a “valet parking” service. On top of that, the political authorities prevent any arms procurement from sources other than the US.

The second reason concerns the nature of this assistance. The US is the army’s largest foreign military supporter, but it is not building the Lebanese army to achieve military superiority or parity with Israel. At the same time, US policy in the region is based on maintaining what Washington calls Israel’s “qualitative military edge.” This is a principle enshrined in US law and taken into account when weapons are sold or transferred to countries in the region. Readiness to protect the southern border requires air defenses, and the US denies the army these weapons.

This creates a clear contradiction. The US says it wants a strong Lebanese army capable of extending state authority, while at the same time remaining committed to ensuring that the military capabilities of countries in the region do not develop in ways that threaten Israel’s qualitative military edge.

As a result, the army receives weapons that are highly useful for combating armed groups and protecting the borders, such as Super Tucano aircraft, helicopters, Hellfire missiles, armored vehicles, small arms, surveillance and communications equipment, and training. But these do not amount to a weapons system designed to fight an air or missile war on equal terms with Israel.

Before all of that, there is a real question that must be put to the Lebanese state: If the army is expected to be the sole institution responsible for defending Lebanon, is there any real willingness to provide it with the weapons, budget, and capabilities it needs to carry out that mission? I do not think so.

The Cradle: Are there figures showing how much Britain has spent supporting the Lebanese army, compared with the US?

A: Yes, but the difference between the scale of US and British support is very large. According to official US figures, the US has invested more than $3 billion in the Lebanese army since 2006, covering weapons, equipment, training, military assistance, and capacity-building. In 2021 alone, US military assistance amounted to around $236 million.

To give an idea of the scale of this assistance, the US provided more than $250 million in security assistance to Lebanon in 2017 alone. It also allocated a package worth around $340 million that included six A-29 Super Tucano aircraft and 32 Bradley armored vehicles, along with other equipment intended to develop the army’s air and ground capabilities.

Britain’s support is much smaller in scale, but it is also significant. According to the latest official British figure, the UK has provided around £180 million (around $2.40 million) to the Lebanese army since 2009 through training, equipment, and capacity-building programs.

The British have focused particularly on the Lebanese–Syrian border, helping establish land border regiments and build dozens of observation towers and border posts. By 2024, they had provided 344 Land Rover vehicles, 100 armored Land Rovers, and 3,450 sets of personal equipment for military personnel. They also helped build around 78 border sites and trained more than 26,500 Lebanese military personnel in border operations and internal security.

As for the British presence along the border, there had been plans to deploy the “model regiment” along the southern border to monitor any movement by local forces toward the south.

In other words, the Americans have focused primarily on building the army’s broader military capabilities, from aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, and guided missiles to reconnaissance, communications, training, and military education. The British, by contrast, have focused heavily on securing the border with Syria, from observation towers, bases, and vehicles to border regiments and training.

This is particularly important in the context of the earlier question about Israel. When you look at the billions and hundreds of millions spent by the two countries, you see that a large share of this capacity-building has been directed toward counterterrorism, securing the border with Syria, internal security, and extending state authority. It has not been directed toward building a conventional military with air defenses or a missile force capable of confronting Israel.

The Cradle: How can we talk about a peace plan while Israel is bombing Lebanon almost daily? And how can a peace process move forward while Israeli attacks continue?

A: For us as military personnel, there is a clear distinction between the political plan and the reality on the ground. We implement the decisions taken by the Lebanese state; we are not the party negotiating peace or determining its terms. There can be no peace in the first place as long as Israel continues to carry out strikes and military operations inside Lebanese territory, repeatedly violates Lebanese airspace, and occupies positions inside Lebanon. At the same time, the Lebanese army is tasked with deploying across the south, taking up positions in new areas, searching facilities, and extending state authority in accordance with decisions issued by the government.

The problem for us is straightforward: the army is being asked to fulfill its obligations, yet we see no corresponding implementation of those obligations on the Israeli side.

When we advance into an area or deploy at a position, we need assurances that the position will not come under attack afterward. And when we are asked to extend state authority across the entire south, it is only natural to ask: How can we extend state authority over territory that Israel still occupies in part and where it continues to conduct military operations?

The army is capable of carrying out its mission when there are clear rules that apply to everyone. But a ceasefire cannot be one-sided. If there is a genuine plan for achieving stability, the military equation is simple: the Lebanese army extends state authority across Lebanese territory, and Israel must first stop its attacks, withdraw from Lebanese territory, and respect Lebanon’s borders and sovereignty. Anything short of that is simply the management of an unstable military situation.

The Cradle: What about the special force that the US is reportedly preparing within the Lebanese army for the task of disarming Hezbollah? How large is it? And how will the rest of the army’s units deal with it?

A: The army’s strike force is trained by the Americans and receives its orders directly from them. This has been the case since the time of Fadi Kfoury, the head of Airport Security. Its personnel also receive cash assistance from the Americans.

The Cradle: How can Joseph Aoun, who himself refused to confront Hezbollah when he was army commander, now ask the army, as president of the republic, to do what he did not dare to do when he was at its helm?

A: A difficult question. But if you want a theoretical answer, when Joseph Aoun was army commander, he did not have the authority to make a political decision to disarm Hezbollah or confront it. The army commander implements the decisions of the political authorities; he cannot decide on his own to open an internal confrontation of this magnitude. During his time as army commander, he was indeed careful not to drag the military institution into a confrontation with Hezbollah, because any such confrontation could threaten internal stability and the cohesion of the army itself.

Today, Joseph Aoun is president of the republic, meaning that his position and role are different. But even in that capacity, he cannot unilaterally order the army to wage an internal war. The decision to place weapons exclusively in the hands of the state is a political decision taken by the constitutional institutions and the government. The army is then tasked with establishing the military mechanism for implementing that decision, not necessarily with carrying it out itself.

So far, the army has sought to implement the decisions of the state without entering into any confrontation. It deploys, takes over positions, confiscates weapons found at the sites it enters, and establishes control over territory that comes under its authority. This is entirely different from sending military units to seize weapons by force.

If the mission later shifts to forcibly disarming Hezbollah, however, we would be facing an entirely different situation. This is not a technical decision that the army commander can handle like any other military mission, because it could have repercussions for internal security and the cohesion of the military institution itself.

From a military standpoint, therefore, the question is not whether Joseph Aoun is asking the army today to do what he refused to do yesterday. The real question is this: Is the army being asked to implement the state’s decision gradually and without confrontation, or to enter into an armed internal confrontation? These are two entirely different things. And if the latter is what is required, the army has the right to know what the political plan is in the absence of national backing for such a confrontation, what its endgame is, and who will bear responsibility for its consequences.

The Cradle: The Lebanese government and the president agreed to release individuals involved in the killing of Lebanese soldiers. How does the army view this decision? And how do soldiers feel about the release of people who fought and killed their comrades?

A: For the army, this is an extremely sensitive issue. We are not talking about an abstract political matter, but about soldiers who were killed and comrades who fought and fell in battles against these groups. There are officers and soldiers who took part in those battles, and families who lost their sons. It is therefore only natural for anger and opposition to surface within the institution when soldiers see people who fought the army or killed its personnel potentially walking free as a result of a decision or political settlement.

But the army is a military institution, not a political party. If the constitutional and judicial authorities decide to release prisoners, the army cannot rebel against the state simply because it disagrees with the decision. We implement the law and the decisions of the legitimate authorities.

That does not mean, however, that soldiers do not feel bitter about it. A soldier who risked his life, or an officer who lost soldiers under his command, has every right to ask: If those who fought the army and killed its personnel are ultimately released as part of a political settlement, what message are we sending to the soldier we will ask tomorrow to fight and die defending the state?

The issue goes directly to the army’s morale. The state cannot ask a soldier to sacrifice his life and then treat the blood of his comrades lightly. We certainly respect the institutions of the state and judicial decisions, but for the military institution, there is a clear moral red line: the blood of soldiers who fell while performing their duty must not become a bargaining chip in any political settlement.

Dr. Omar Nashabe is a criminal justice and human rights specialist with extensive academic and advisory experience. He has worked with Lebanese state institutions, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and UN experts, and has published widely on prison reform and human rights.

Links: Senior Lebanese army officer interview

https://thecradle.co/articles-id/40200

cross-posted from: https://lemmygrad.ml/post/13032398

Somebody wrote a paper about us. Apologies to the mods for not censoring names but given that it is literally public I couldn't give a shit.

I find their abstract really funny.. and its even funnier that they are watching us.

Anyhow leave ur reactions below

Rabbi Yaakov and civil rights lawyer Eric Lee defend Orthodox Jewish activist Yehonatan Ovadia, who was detained by ICE after joining Jewish residents protesting an "Israeli" flag in their neighborhood.

Video by Guy Christensen

Critiquing a contingent of the left that despises the idea of protesting Zohran to hold him accountable for his positions on Palestine and examining how it has devolved into parasocial censorship of his critics.

Aleksandar speaks about plenty of topics regarding imperialism:

• Talks about Fidel Castro and Cuba
• Talks about the kidnapping of Maduro and the US aggressions against Cuba and Nicaragua
• Talks about West Asia(Palestine, Yemen)
• Talks about US provocation to China through Taiwan
• Talks about US provocation to DPRK
• Talks about Ukraine and how the Communist Party of Ukraine was forced underground
• Talks about the late Yugoslavia
• He concludes that 21st Century will be the Socialist Century.

Wanted to share with you all because this is the type of speeches that some communists from Europe and Asia are bringing to this Seminar.

Syria under the Jolani regime has embedded itself in the US-Israeli security architecture, argues analyst Kevork Almassian. In this Deep Dive Perspective conversation we examine what that shift means for the axis of resistance , Palestine and the future of West Asia.

In this roaming exercise across West Asia, Almassian describes an existential crisis for both what he terms the Zionist-Western imperialist axis and the Axis of Resistance, with the Syria front as central. He argues the renewed debate over the past is being used to distract from current developments on the ground.

According to Almassian, the Jolani regime is allowing Israeli territorial gains and entrenchment, aligning strategically with the US, and permitting Turkish expansion in northern Syria, while internal corruption grows. He also claims Syrian conflict death tolls have been inflated and misattributed, and argues social media narratives, including those pushed by some Dawah influencers, liberals, and what he calls MI6/CIA strategies, are recycling claims like "Assad is worse than Netanyahu" to undermine resistance actors.

The discussion then expands to Yemen and regional security. Almassian discusses Ansarullah's leverage over Bab al-Mandeb, claims around a Mecca Pact and pressure on Saudi Arabia, criticism of Turkey and Pakistan's positions on Gaza, the possibility discussed of Syrian fighters being deployed to Yemen, Iran's stated loss of trust in US diplomacy, and Iran's aim to minimize US influence to reshape regional security.

In This Episode:

Why Almassian says debate over Syria's past distracts from Jolani's present alignment

What Almassian claims about Israeli gains, US alignment and Turkish expansion in Syria

How he describes PSYOPs, death-toll manipulation and influencer narratives Why he links Dawah preachers and liberal Zionist commentary to undermining the Axis of Resistance What he argues about corruption inside the Jolani administration

How Yemen, Bab al-Mandeb and Ansarullah fit into regional leverage What is discussed about the Mecca Pact, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan Whether Syrian troops could be sent to Lebanon or Yemen, in his assessment How he sees Iran's next moves and the absence of an Arab project

CHAPTERS: 00:00​ - Introduction: Kevork Almassian on West Asia Crisis

01:53​ - Blessed Revolution Debate & Jolani Regime Alignment

07:46​ - Dawah Preachers, PSYOPs and Axis of Resistance Narratives

13:04​ - Liberal Zionists, Palestine and Media Manipulation Claims

21:02​ - Jolani's Army, Corruption and Usefulness to the US

29:15​ - Mecca Pact, Turkey, Pakistan and Yemen

39:39​ - Israel, Jolani Non-Intervention Claims and Balkanization

47:46​ - Iran Distrust of US and Reshaping Regional Security

GUEST: Kevork Almassian, described in this conversation as an independent commentator on West Asian affairs with a focus on Syria. He runs the YouTube channel Syrian Analysis.

Dr. Fadi Lama is an international advisor to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and a consultant in geoeconomics, industry, SMEs, and academia, with a PhD in Mechanical Engineering.

Article | The west's Plan B: Secure the realm https://thecradle.co/articles/the-wests-plan-b-secure-the-realm

0:00​ The west's Plan B strategy 2:38​ Redefining economic power 7:02​ Analyzing sovereign vs vassal 10:35​ Erosion of the empire 15:10​ Financial system manipulation 20:10​ Internal decline and poverty 23:33​ China's economic transition 31:06​ The role of the RIC alliance 37:48​ The Iran war as a catalyst 48:05​ Geopolitical outlook and risk 58:46​ Irreversible decline of the west

The US has no strategy while Iran is very clear about their strategy to remove US bases and Palestinian self-determination...as Western propaganda clouds the reality, we discuss the fight for sovereignty from Iran to Yemen with Iranian political analyst Ali Alizadeh

cross-posted from: https://lemmygrad.ml/post/12888907

Over the past year and a half, one of ProleWiki's editors has been conducting a course of weekly classes in Marxism and Juche that goes from basic philosophical foundations, such as dialectical materialism, to primary contradictions, and analyzing the real world application of these concepts. This course is open to people in different stages of learning and will adapt according to the needs of the learner.

Classes are held on Saturdays and Sundays (pick the day you can attend as both days are the same class). Classes are conducted in voice chat, currently via Jitsi Meet which is simple to use and requires no account. There is also an announcements-only Discord server for those who would like to see class-related updates there.

Class days and times

• Saturdays: 10am Mexico City time
• Sundays: 7am Mexico City time

Links for further information

• Discord
• DeltaChat

A little more about the course: As noted in the course's Discord server, these learning sessions uphold the inclusive values of Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed with critical consciousness and the Siksika pedagogy. This course is developed to be safe for all ages, for LGBT+ people, and people with sensory sensitivites to attend. When it comes to disagreements with classmates or the teacher, the focus is on developing competence in articulating your own understanding and communicating your differences respectfully, not on compelling people to conform. Students may communicate with the teacher to discuss special accommodations.

cross-posted from: https://lemmygrad.ml/post/12967634

Five years ago, I visited two cities in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region: Kashgar and the capital Urumqi. I went back again to see just how things have changed.

In Kashgar, I was refused entry to mosques, discovered an elderly Uygur working for much less than minimum wage, and chatted with children who are forced to learn a language that is completely foreign to them. But trust me, it's not what you think! And since I'm not the BBC or Buzzfeed, I will actually tell you guys the full story.

Come with me as I explore the ancient city of Kashgar and the modern metropolis of Urumqi, talking exclusively with ethnic minorities in the region.

In Urumqi, I visit a Uygur language radio station and a Uygur language newspaper, despite Western pundits claiming the language is banned.

And I celebrate Eid al-Adha, or Festival of the Sacrifice, the largest Muslim festival in all of Xinjiang, which gives the people of the region an extra five days of annual leave. More than anyone else in the rest of China. That is all despite Western pundits claiming religion is suppressed here.

I spent the day celebrating with a local family, eating lamb that was freshly slaughtered in accordance with tradition.

Don't be tricked by Western media and governments who are using Xinjiang as a tool against China and its development. Instead, come with me to see the place and chat with the locals.

Excerpts from a speech delivered at a conference of the USSR State Security Committee, February 1979

(...)

Ideological subversion takes place in the realm encompassing political, philosophical, legal, ethical, aesthetic, religious, and other views and ideas—that is, in the sphere of ideology where a battle of ideas is waged. Therefore, ideological subversion shares many characteristics inherent with ideological struggle. However, it is not the conventional ideological struggle, which is the objective outcome of the current existence of two opposing systems. Ideological subversion is, first and foremost, a form of subversive activity by imperialism against socialism. Its purpose is to weaken and destabilize the socialist system. It is carried out by special means and often amounts to direct interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries, contravening generally recognized norms of international law and socialist laws. The fact that it is conducted in the field of ideology does not alter its subversive and illegal nature. This is what determines, first and foremost, the firmness and intransigence of our fight against ideological subversion in any form.

(...)

Ideological subversion is based entirely and completely on lies, fabrication, and the gross distortion of facts. It is also distinguished by the fact that nowadays it is not carried out by a conventional propaganda apparatus, but by specially organized services. These special services, of course, make use of the machinery of bourgeois propaganda and utilize all forms of mass communication, but they place their main bets on specialized subversive channels.

(...)

This subversion is aimed at influencing citizens' views and feelings, their worldview, and, through their conscience, their political and moral conduct.

(...) in the sphere of the struggle for men's minds, imperialism does not rely exclusively on the means of conventional ideological struggle, on bourgeois ideas that were long ago exposed as unpopular and reactionary. It employs the poisoned weapon of ideological saboteurs: disinformation and slander, falsification and lies.

(...) it is precisely the morally powerful and politically characterless individual, susceptible to various feelings and rumors, who becomes the first victim of ideological subversion.

(...)

The work of the state security organs in neutralizing the ideological subversion of imperialism is, first and foremost, a political task. State security personnel must always remember that they are the political fighters of our Party in the most crucial areas of the class struggle. The primary and indispensable condition for adhering to the correct political line in all the activities of the state security organs is their daily guidance by the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee.

The specific working conditions of the state security bodies impose particularly rigorous demands on those assigned to work and fight in this area. Among all these demands, the qualities of communists hold a place of honor: ideologically dedicated fighters, politically mature, and energetic defenders of the Party line. They are obliged to be principled, selfless, and loyal to the Party.

Speeches and writings, YV Andropov.

Taken from https://telegra.ph/Subversi%C3%B3n-ideol%C3%B3gica--el-arma-envenenada-del-imperialismo-10-05