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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/53440357

Classic Meta ;) Meta Muse ain't Kawaii btw!

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I wanna sign up for Patreon. Reason is, to give money to some podcasters, musicians, OSS authors. Ppl I think are doing good things. That's how they accept donations.

But was there a privacy clusterfuck? Of course there was!

In October 2015, the site was the target of a large cyber-attack, with almost 15 gigabytes of password data, donation records, and source code taken and published. The breach exposed more than 2.3 million unique e-mail addresses and millions of private messages. Following the attack, some patrons received extortion emails ...

I tried to signup privately. I only want to give money to ppl. Well if you use a VPN you get a total cloudfare gauntlet. Every page load, prove you are human! You can sign up with a masked card and a VPN, but they insta-ban you. Before you can sign-in even once, acct is locked.

Has anyone signed up in a kinda private way? How?

I can't "just use this one cryptocurrency bro" b/c the creators I want to give money to only are on Patreon.

FFS. I'm trying to give money away! I don't have to, but I belive we should support ppl doing good things for the world. Can't even do that privtaely I guess.

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Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) are mass surveillance. They photograph every passing car and log where and when it was captured, building a searchable record of where nearly everyone drives. Cities should not buy them, and cities that already have them should shut them down.

Where these systems still operate, courts and state legislatures must reduce their harms by (among other things) requiring police to get a warrant before searching stored ALPR data. A warrant requirement would not make mass surveillance acceptable, but it would require police to justify a search to a judge before accessing records of people’s movements. Without this independent judicial check on police power, officers have been searching this data for improper reasons (many exposed by EFF) that violate our fundamental rights.

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Technical report on Android VPN lockdown bypass via NAT-T keepalive offload.

The direct attacker value is repeated real-network identity disclosure. A destination controlled by the attacker can learn the source IP address as seen from the physical Wi-Fi network, the fact that the device remains online, and packet timing while the keepalive remains armed. Depending on the network, the source IP can imply ISP, organization, travel state, or correlation between a device expected to be behind a VPN and a non-VPN access network.

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When a Department of Homeland Security official sent out an alert to stop Samuel Tunick, a Stop Cop City activist, at an airport in January 2025, they said the reason was because he was suspected of “terrorist activities,” according to new filed court records which include a screenshot of the alert and photos of Tunick’s interrogation.

Tunick ultimately provided Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials with a code that, when entered, wiped his security- and privacy-focused GrapheneOS phone. Tunick is now being criminally charged for that alleged act, in one of the most high profile technology civil rights cases in recent memory.

The court records also showed that CBP officials lied to Tunick during his interrogation. Instead of saying he was being targeted for suspected terrorism — although this search happened just at the start of the second Trump administration, it has dramatically broadened what organizations or people may be considered such — they said they needed his phone to look for “kiddie porn.”

“Good afternoon,” an email sent from a Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) official, part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), to CBP and other officials reads. “The following subject is scheduled to arrive in ATL [Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport] today via DL 1778 @ 1930 Hours. TUNICK is under investigation by HSI/JTTF for suspected terrorist activities.” The email includes a photo of Tunick, and asks the officials to direct him to secondary inspection, retain all of his electronics, and collect their passcodes.

As 404 Media first revealed in December, Tunick was charged because he allegedly “did knowingly destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, and otherwise take any action to delete the digital contents of a Google Pixel cellular phone, for the purpose of preventing and impairing the Government’s lawful authority to take said property into its custody and control.” Matthew Dodge, one of Tunick’s lawyers, previously told 404 Media he only found one other case using the same obscure law, a drug trafficking case. “This is extraordinarily rare,” Dodge said.

Tunick was part of the Stop Cop City movement in Atlanta, which broadly protested the building of a large police training center, and which authorities investigated for arson, vandalism, and doxing. Tunick is not suspected of any crime beyond the alleged wiping of the phone, and has previously put his current prosecution in the context of the wide spanning cases against other Stop Cop City protesters.

The newly filed court record, in which Tunick’s lawyers argue that evidence should be thrown out, include new photos and descriptions of the airport encounter. The CBP officials asked Tunick if they were going to find “kiddie porn” on his phone, which Tunick immediately denied. “As the evidentiary hearing made clear, these unfounded accusations were nothing more than pretext for a fishing expedition into the depths of Mr. Tunick’s devices,” the lawyers wrote. They added, “Officer Findley acknowledged that officers had no reason whatsoever to believe Mr. Tunick possessed child pornography,” referring to one of the officials.

Tunick faces a maximum of five years in federal prison for allegedly wiping the phone.

“I hope people understand that the charges against me are meant to intimidate people against protecting their data and their privacy, and the government hopes to set a precedent that no one has the right to privacy,” Tunick previously told 404 Media.

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Security personnel around the world are on high alert Tuesday following the discovery of eight TLS certificates with private keys so weak they could allow anyone to mint trusted browser and app credentials for any site on the Internet.

As of late morning Tuesday, browser makers and some major apps and programming languages had blocked all eight of the intermediate certificates. There are no reports of certificate transparency logs, which track the issuance of all browser-trusted certificates, showing the compromised keys being used maliciously. The threat remains far from over, however, because it will be hard and time-consuming to update other key parts of the Internet, such as Linux distributions and embedded and Internet of Things devices. One word: bonkers

The eight intermediate certificates belong to India-based certificate authority eMudhra Limited. An informal advisory published to emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com over on Tuesday posted the message “We have a problem here – Wayne.” The words were digitally signed using the private key of one of the eMudhra certificates. With proof that the reporting party had control of the key, defenders scrambled because the same key could be used to sign unauthorized certificates that would be trusted by millions of servers worldwide.

“This will be a massive cleanup job, bigger than Heartbleed,” Filippo Valsorda, a cryptography engineer and a cryptography maintainer for the open source Go programming language, told Ars. “There will be a very, very long tail, IoT devices, Docker containers, forgotten Linux machines, unmaintained CLI tools that shipped their own copy of the roots (which is common in some ecosystems, like Python). Also, Linux distributions are still rolling out updates, some of them are not ready yet, and then system administrators will need to apply them to a lot of machines.”

Heartbleed is the name of a critical vulnerability in the OpenSSL cryptography library. In 2014, it came under mass exploitation. Exploits let many unaffiliated hackers decrypt TLS-protected exchanges between parties. They also recovered private TLS certificate keys, session cookies, and passwords. The attacks compromised thousands of servers, some belonging to large companies and government agencies around the world.

Recovery required a long series of steps that took years. Steps included patching OpenSSL on all affected devices, reissuing millions of TLS keys, revoking old certificates, rotating passwords and session tokens and updating embedded devices and other forgotten systems—something that was extremely time- and resource-intensive, especially at Internet scale.

“Every time you need a lot of different people in different contexts to do something, it will take a long time,” Valsorda explained. “This time it’s worse because there’s more contexts, more people, and more heterogeneity.”

The compromised eMudhra keys were defective at a level that’s challenging the imagination of many of the engineers studying the incident. A normal size for a NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, a size allowing almost 2384, or a number with 116 digits, different possibilities. The private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.

“That is extremely in the ‘this should not be possible’ category,” Valdorda said. “Maybe some horribly dangerous key generation interface has a ‘size’ parameter and they set it to 1 by mistake???”

Ben Cartwright-Cox, director of BGP.tools, said: “My guess is that it’s example code that accidentally leaked to production, but hard to know. But it’s bonkers that no one noticed.”

At this early stage, the most immediate threat appears to be for those using VPNs, especially in countries with governments likely to maliciously intercept traffic. There are likely many other cases for concern. End users largely have no recourse other than to hold off using many non-browser forms of TLS communication until they receive assurances updates are in place.

As noted, most browsers have already blocked the intermediate certificates. The exception appears to be Edge, which at the time this article went live was still connecting to 12 vulnerable hosts. In response to questions asking why and if the company has plans to do so, a Microsoft representative the company will be in touch if it has anything to “share.” Meanwhile, Signal, WhatsApp, Wireguard, and other apps that don’t rely on TLS for confidentiality aren’t affected. This page and the emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com site show apps known to be patched so far.

The incident is the latest to expose a fatal flaw in the TLS regimen. It’s only as strong as its weakest link, which in this case was eMudhra. Fortunately, transparency logs account for much of that failure, but this measure requires parties to actively monitor massive feeds and works only after unauthorized certificates have been issued. eMudhra representatives weren’t immediately available to answer questions.

One caveat: exploiting compromised certificates requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack, meaning the attacker must act as a proxy between two TLS parties and receive encrypted traffic, decrypt it, reencrypt it, and send it to the other party. Such capabilities, in some cases, are usually limited to only the most well-resourced attackers. People with control of a local network—at a coffee shop, university, or other organization—face much less of a challenge.

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Muse, the new general-purpose AI agent from Meta, can expose sensitive information when users share conversations through web links, researchers reported Monday. In response to questions from Ars about the behavior, Meta said it’s suspending the sharing feature while the company reviews it and considers making changes.

Like many online services, Muse has allowed users to share searches, conversations, images, and similar content with other people. Such share features usually involve clicking an option to create a unique URL that anyone can use to load a page hosting the content. To keep potentially sensitive information from being accessible to unintended people, the URLs typically contain a long sequence of text that can’t be easily guessed. A single query is all that’s required

Muse, which Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg said last month was “built from the ground up for privacy and security,” seems to take the same precautions. But a central design decision for constructing URLs has made the links easy to discover. As a result, researchers from security firm Claroc said they were able to enumerate 6,800 links Muse users created for sharing conversations with others. After opening a few hundred of them, the researchers found information that was clearly not intended to be publicly available, including:

a candidate’s notes preparing for a confidential executive-search call with a frontier AI lab, naming the lab’s internal contact and the meeting time
a national marketing company’s internal revenue review, marked for its CEO
a small-business owner’s loan application, with the amount requested
a to-do list that included a bank fraud alert, with a partial account number and a transaction amount and time
a real-estate investor’s internal performance report, with two property addresses and exact return, income, and mortgage figures
a workplace’s full-year staff vacation calendar, listing dozens of employees against the week each one would be away

“If you had asked us beforehand, we would have guessed that gathering these would take real effort,” the researchers wrote. “It took one query.”

In an emailed statement responding to questions from Ars, Meta said:

We opened the Muse bug bounty program so researchers could raise different scenarios and help us continue improving the product. People have the ability to share specific Muse artifacts, which creates a page that can be accessed by those with the link. However, we’ve paused this functionality while we review this report and consider changes to how these links can be discovered.

Asaf Aprozper, the co-founder and CTO of Claroc, said he reported the findings through Meta’s bug bounty program on October 8 and also tried reaching people at Meta on LinkedIn, but got no reply either way.

The easiest way to discover the URLs is to perform a passive DNS search through one of many available commercial services. Passive DNS records store the historical resolution of domain names to IP addresses, as well as nameserver, and mail-server records over time. Passive DNS systems typically collect DNS responses from sensors positioned at recursive DNS resolvers or other infrastructure. A passive DNS record is generally created when a monitoring system observes a DNS response. In the case here, once the intended party clicks on the share link, the DNS information is recorded in a searchable database.

Claroc researchers were able to discover the Muse share links because all of them use the domain name cf.metaaiusercontent.com. Discovery is further made easy by the decision to add the conversation name to the URL, along with a long string of text. Simplified examples of such links are home-sale-budget-9f21c8a3.cf.metaaiusercontent.com, q3-revenue-review-7b1e42f0.cf.metaaiusercontent.com, and loan-application-draft-a4c9e2.cf.metaaiusercontent.com. It’s this last design decision, putting the conversation title in the subdomain rather than in the URL path, that makes public discovery possible.

“Plenty of AI assistants share by public link,” Claroc said. “What makes Muse’s shares easy to find is the title sitting inside the web address, where public DNS records it for anyone to search. We call these GhostShares: pages that open for people who were never handed the link, and that those people can find on their own.”

Muse quickly catapulted to one of the top spots in Apple’s App Store. The assistant autonomously fills out forms, books appointments, makes purchases, creates documents, and carries out all kinds of other actions. To work as intended, Muse requires access to most of a user’s accounts. Meta has heavily marketed the assistant as a platform that’s worthy of the extraordinary trust it needs to work as intended.

Three weeks after the Muse launch, macOS security expert Patrick Wardle discovered a zero-day vulnerability that allowed any other app installed on the same device to gain complete control of the user’s Muse account. Meta downplayed the severity of the vulnerability on the grounds that exploitation wasn’t possible unless a device was already compromised. The company didn’t acknowledge Wardle’s finding that a simple ClickFix attack was all that was needed to hijack an account. The ease in discovering share links further justifies asking if Muse is worthy of the access it requires.

With Meta’s suspension of the feature, Muse users no longer face this particular threat, at least for now.

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MapQuest... welcome to the resistance.

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When state lawmakers attempt to rewrite how the internet works, users rely on courts to recognize that laws can’t make technical impossibilities a reality. That’s why we were happy to see that a court has blocked Utah’s attempt to outlaw the privacy protections of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).

In a win for digital rights, a federal judge has issued a preliminary injunction blocking Utah’s SB 73, the state’s draconian anti-VPN age verification law. The decision comes as EFF submitted our comments to the Utah Department of Commerce, detailing how forcing platforms to detect and block privacy-preserving tools undermines user privacy and security worldwide while demanding the impossible.
What SB 73 Does

Signed into law earlier this year, SB 73 attempted to regulate adult websites by requiring them to block VPN users or to identify the physical location of visitors using them or similar tools that mask their network traffic. It even went so far as to prohibit websites from offering instructions on how to use a VPN to bypass these checks. This made Utah, to EFF’s knowledge, the first state in the nation to target the use of VPNs to avoid legally mandated age-verification gates.

The Utah federal court halted enforcement of the law's VPN provisions last week, ruling that the law likely violates the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition on passing laws that significantly burden businesses and people outside Utah’s borders.

SB 73 burdens the rights of all internet users outside of Utah because it requires adult websites to either know every visiting user’s physical location, and then block those in Utah, or to verify every visitor’s age just in case they might be in Utah. The law’s “actual-location provision in practice requires an entity to perform age verification services for every user visiting its site from any location because the entity would violate the law if even one of those users happened to be obfuscating,” the court wrote. The court essentially ruled that Utah has less-burdensome ways to prevent Utah minors from accessing adult websites than requiring all users in the world to comply with SB 73.

Aylo’s lawsuit does not challenge SB 73’s provision prohibiting the websites covered by the law from sharing information about VPNs. The Legal Challenge

This court order follows months of legal maneuvering.

Initially set to go into effect in May 2026, SB 73 sparked an immediate constitutional challenge from Aylo, the parent company of major online adult platforms like Pornhub. In response to the lawsuit, Utah and Aylo initially agreed that the state would pause enforcement while the court considered the preliminary injunction request or until administrative rules setting specific compliance terms were finalized. Those proposed compliance rules (R152-78B, see Utah State Bulletin, page 6) were published by the Utah Department of Commerce’s Division of Consumer Protection on September 1st, and EFF submitted formal comments to the Department in opposition. According to the notice, the proposed rules could be effective as soon as October 8, 2026. However, Judge Barlow’s decision means that it cannot be enforced pending further action by the court.

The Ruling

EFF welcomes Judge Barlow’s ruling, which recognizes the fundamental disconnect between state legislation of the internet and how technology works. In his ruling, Judge Barlow noted that the statute requires a technical impossibility on pain of legal liability. “Aylo is correct that the statute, as amended, now essentially imposes strict liability for entities like it when it comes to determining the location of its websites’ users.”

The court recognized that the problem is that SB 73 “requires entities like Aylo to geolocate its website users with perfection to avoid liability.” But, at the same time, the court acknowledged “that geolocation perfection is not presently possible.”

EFF explained this technical impossibility in our comment to the Department of Commerce. VPNs protect user privacy by routing web traffic through intermediary servers. Because destination websites only see the IP address of the VPN server, they have no reliable mechanism to tell whether a connection originates from Salt Lake City, Seattle, or Shanghai. So, under Utah's current statutory framework, platforms are left with an impossible choice: completely block all VPN traffic nationwide or withdraw access from Utah entirely. Judge Barlow agreed, asserting:

Because the law requires perfection in the absence of perfect geolocation tools, Aylo would need to verify those 28 million users—whether located in Salt Lake City, Boston, New Orleans, Anchorage, or Honolulu—to ensure compliance and avoid liability.

The Rulemaking

The administrative rules drafted by the state compelled commercial entities to implement "commercially reasonable geolocation obfuscation detection systems", which is a directive, we argue, that demands a technical impossibility.

In our submission to the Utah Department of Commerce, EFF also detailed how these rules force an invasive data collection regime onto internet users everywhere. So, in response to internet users trying to avoid invasive data collection required by age-verification requirements, SB 73 requires even greater surveillance of internet users’ online activities. The Department’s suggested detection heuristics (like monitoring connection latency or device time zones) are notoriously unreliable and easily skewed by normal network conditions. This active surveillance inevitably leads to widespread misclassification, unwarranted access blocks, and severe impacts on users’ privacy far beyond Utah's borders.

You can read EFF’s full comments to the Department of Commerce here.

What Now?

As we’ve said time and time again: the internet will always route around censorship.

Mandating invasive tracking and punishing the use of essential security tools turns genuine privacy concerns into mere compliance theater and requires more state-mandated surveillance of internet users who rely on VPNs. As is the case in heavily censored regions, VPN services and obfuscation tools will simply adapt, making this framework fundamentally unsustainable.

As we’ve said time and time again: the internet will always route around censorship.

While Utah legislators have indicated they may attempt to revise the law during the next legislative session, the court's preliminary injunction sets an important precedent: state lawmakers should not weaponize age verification to force dragnet tracking or undermine essential security tools.

As other states consider similar anti-VPN proposals, EFF will continue pushing back against these technically impossible mandates and defending users’ privacy and anonymity. Thus, we urge legislators and regulators to reject anti-privacy rules, prioritize real user security, and safeguard constitutional protections for all users.

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  • EFF and three labor unions are suing the Trump administration over alleged surveillance of visa holders and green-card holders’ social-media activity, including use of AI/automated tools.
  • The lawsuit argues that monitoring and punishing people based on their political views violates the First Amendment and federal administrative law.
  • Major development: a federal judge rejected the government’s attempt to dismiss the case, ruling that the court can hear it and that the unions have legal standing to sue.
  • Next step: the lawsuit proceeds to discovery, where EFF expects to obtain more information about how the government’s surveillance program operates.
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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/53255681

Meta quickly changed their brand new commercial terms after the news of their plans to "train" on data broke and were covered by major publications!

Seems they haven't heard of the web archive yet: http://web.archive.org/web/20261016114851/https://www.facebook.com/legal/commercial_terms_preview

The word "train" disappeared within a day of the #AI training speculations.

Read more on the topic here: https://lemmy.world/post/53252379

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Is There any way to Escape From Meta(facebook) Survilence.

  • First of All I dont like whatsapp and Asked my contacts to use Signal instead to message me. Some of them did but many didn't because They don't mind their personal data being send to pervy facebook's survilence server. They Say things like "Am I doing Any Crime Then Why Should I Care" and "Only Criminals Will Try To Hide Their Conversation". Its hard to ignore whatsapp as most people will never to make a switch to signal or any other messenger.

  • Secondly I am tired of telling my friends to stop using Instagram. They are very addicted to it and can't leave its algorithm and slop. I don't use instagram for reels I only use it to communicating with my friends who only DM me reels and posts

  • Lastly I don't use facebook but many person I know uses it, when I took a look at it I was able surprised to see many unrestricted NSFW content was there under recommendation panel also Saw the same on instagram.

Any Recommended Stratergy To make them ditch Meta ?

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/53252379

Businesses & affiliated entities should REALLY reconsider using ANY Meta product.

By using WhatsApp, Instagram, Facebook... they now automatically opt-in to their websites getting scraped, collected & used to train (likely) MetaAI.

It includes the creation of fake accounts (so called test credentials¹) to gain further access, to restricted data.

Only options to opt-out:

  1. c/DeMeta
  2. Robots.txt with: User-agent: FacebookBot Disallow: / User-agent: Meta-ExternalAgent Disallow: /

Source:

¹ https://www.facebook.com/legal/commercial_terms_preview

METAdata!

Part 1 of the paragraph:

"You authorize us (or any entity acting on our behalf) to use automated software (such as web scrapers, bots, robots, spiders, crawlers, and user agents) and create test credentials to access, index, cache, analyze, collect, retrieve, or crawl the domains, web pages, or URLs (and any content available through them)..."

So this data can even be collected by 3rd parties working with Meta?

Part 2 of the paragraph:

...that are associated with your products or services, or that are made available through your or users' use of Meta Company Products and services, and to periodically pull updates from such domains, web pages, or URLs in order to provide, develop, improve, research, and maintain advertising and business products...

"your or users' use" is especially concerning, as it is extremely loosely phrased and would cover a wide range of people.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/53166284

This law affects everyone, especially people in the EU and is an attempt to implement ID verification on: Video-sharing platforms, #AI chatbots, AI companions, games, software app stores and operating systems. https://mastodon.social/@madeindex/117285674482286098

We need to: #STOPEUKIDSACT NOW!

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Often times, I tell people to what extend big tech is willing to hurt people, to collect more and more money, as in data! And the reaction is… disappointing. They either don’t care, sometimes even making jokes, or don’t get over the inconvenience of switching.

If I tell them that that some of those privacy apps, like brave compared to chrome, is more convenient, they don’t care. If I tell them that they hurt themselves by using big tech, like TikTok, they don’t care. If I tell them that their use of those apps hurt others, they don’t care.

I don’t think I am convincing enough. So what can I tell them?

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/53163373

Meta glasses were caught spying on their users once more. Meta was quick to "fix" and therefore admit it: "This issue has been resolved..."

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Disclosure: I'm one of the developers. SOV Network is open source (Apache-2.0), live and working today, and I'd love this community to try it and give honest feedback.

Proof of personhood usually means a company scanning your eyes with custom hardware and keeping the result. SOV Network takes a different route. Here is exactly what happens.

On your phone: you enrol with a palm scan and a live face check using your own phone's camera. No photo of your palm or face is stored or sent anywhere. The app turns each scan into a set of numbers describing it (a feature vector, not a picture) and sends that over an encrypted link.

On the network: the node turns those numbers into a protected (cancelable) template and stores only that. Nodes compare templates for one purpose: making sure one human has exactly one account. There is no picture of anyone on the network.

Messages: end-to-end encrypted. Joining needs no phone number and no email. Nodes refuse plaintext and keep no message content; if the recipient is offline, the message waits on the sender's own device. For delivery receipts a node keeps a small record (message ID, two pseudonymous IDs, type, time) that deletes itself after 90 days by default, and citizens can vote that down to 7.

Proven on the live network: enrolment across nodes, wallet restore, signed payments, a simultaneous double-spend refused by the nodes, cross-node messaging, the built-in exchange, the inheritance Vault and citizen votes.

Next on the roadmap: liveness verified by the nodes as well as the app, the template key split across independent operators, and more operators joining the founding servers. The whitepaper covers the full design and threat model.

Try it (Android, Windows, macOS, Linux): https://sov-network.github.io/ Whitepaper: https://sov-network.github.io/whitepaper.html Source: https://github.com/sov-network-dev/sov-build-source Questions of any kind are welcome here or in our public Q&A: https://github.com/sov-network-dev/sov-build-source/discussions

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A rebuttal to an anti-passkey, pro-TOTP post that has made the rounds on Lemmy as well.

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