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A Chinese state-owned company that was previously sanctioned by the U.S. for facilitating human rights abuses against Uyghurs is now training police officers in Tibet on hacking techniques and digital forensics, according to a watchdog organization.

SDIC Intelligence Xiamen Information Co Ltd, a digital forensics company better known as Meiya Pico, won a contract in mid-2023 to build two labs at the Tibet Police College: one on offensive and defensive cyber techniques and the other on electronic evidence collection and analysis. Details of the approximately $1.32 million contract were analyzed and released on Wednesday by Turquoise Roof, a research network focused on Tibet.

The contracts include “servers for the cyber range, network switches, intrusion simulation software, forensic workstations and] evidence storage systems,” the researchers said.

Founded in 1999 as an independent company, Meiya Pico is now state-owned, and as of 2019 it reportedly had a 45% market share of China’s digital forensics market. Its products have raised controversy globally for their invasiveness, including a spyware app called MFSocket that police have allegedly installed on phones throughout the country during inspections of smartphones.

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According to the company, it has conducted training courses in 30 countries as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

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Archived

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In one [Tiktok] video that has nearly 10 million views, a creator claims to be able to sell yoga pants from the same manufacturer that supplies Lululemon for $5-$6, instead of the $100 they sell for in the United States.

“The material and the craftsmanship are basically the same because they come from the same production line,” she says, standing in front of what appears to be a factory.

In another, a man standing on a factory floor claims to have access to manufacturers that produce Louis Vuitton bags, which he says can be sold directly to customers for $50.

But both companies deny their products are finished in China, and experts told The Independent the videos are likely an effort by counterfeit or “dupe” manufacturers to take advantage of the chaos over the tariffs to boost their sales.

“They're trying to conflate the fake manufacturers in China with the real manufacturers,” said Conrad Quilty-Harper, author of Dark Luxury, a newsletter about the luxury goods industry.

“They're very clever with their social media, and they’re very effective at driving demand in the West,” he added.

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Louis Vuitton has said repeatedly that it does not manufacture products in China.

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TikTok users have reported seeing the videos appear in their feeds in recent days as the trade war between the U.S. and China continues to heat up.

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The counterfeit market in China is the largest in the world. U.S. Customs seized counterfeit items worth some $1.8 billion in recommended retail price in 2023.

Quilty-Harper said the counterfeit industry in China has been a concern for Western companies for years. And the enforcement of trademark and intellectual property rights internally has tended to depend on the geopolitical climate.

“In the past, the Chinese authorities have been stricter on it, and sometimes they've been looser on it, and often that's to do with the relationship with the US and previous presidents,” he said.

“This is part of a huge geopolitical battle between America and China over intellectual property. And it's just fascinating to see this sort of propaganda fight happening on these very high-traffic TikTok videos,” he added.

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[This is an op-ed by Valentin Weber, senior research fellow with the German Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of the International Forum for Democratic Studies report “Data-Centric Authoritarianism: How China’s Development of Frontier Technologies Could Globalize Repression.” His research covers the intersection of cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and technological spheres of influence.]

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While the financial, economic, technological, and national-security implications of DeepSeek’s achievement have been widely covered, there has been little discussion of its significance for authoritarian governance. DeepSeek has massive potential to enhance China’s already pervasive surveillance state, and it will bring the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) closer than ever to its goal of possessing an automated, autonomous, and scientific tool for repressing its people.

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With the world’s largest public AI-surveillance networks — “smart cities” — Chinese police started to amass vast amounts of data. But some Chinese experts lamented that smart cities were not actually that smart: They could track and find pedestrians and vehicles but could not offer concrete guidance to authorities — such as providing police officers with different options for handling specific situations.

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China’s surveillance-industrial complex took a big leap in the mid-2010s. Now, AI-powered surveillance networks could do more than help the CCP to track the whereabouts of citizens (the chess pawns). It could also suggest to the party which moves to make, which figures to use, and what strategies to take.

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Inside China, such a network of large-scale AGI [Artificial Generative Intelligence] systems could autonomously improve repression in real time, rooting out the possibility of civic action in urban metropolises. Outside the country, if cities such as Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia — where China first exported Alibaba’s City Brain system in 2018 — were either run by a Chinese-developed city brain that had reached AGI or plugged into a Chinese city-brain network, they would quietly lose their governance autonomy to these highly complex systems that were devised to achieve CCP urban-governance goals.

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As China’s surveillance state begins its third evolution, the technology is beginning to shift from merely providing decision-making support to actually acting on the CCP’s behalf.

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The next step in the evolution of China’s surveillance state will be to integrate generative-AI models like DeepSeek into urban surveillance infrastructures. Lenovo, a Hong Kong corporation with headquarters in Beijing, is already rolling out programs that fuse LLMs with public-surveillance systems. In [the Spanish city of] Barcelona, the company is administering its Visual Insights Network for AI (VINA), which allows law enforcement and city-management personnel to search and summarize large amounts of video footage instantaneously.

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The CCP, with its vast access to the data of China-based companies, could use DeepSeek to enforce laws and intimidate adversaries in myriad ways — for example, deploying AI police agents to cancel a Lunar New Year holiday trip planned by someone required by the state to stay within a geofenced area; or telephoning activists after a protest to warn of the consequences of joining future demonstrations. It could also save police officers’ time. Rather than issuing “invitations to tea” (a euphemism for questioning), AI agents could conduct phone interviews and analyze suspects’ voices and emotional cues for signs of repentance. Police operators would, however, still need to confirm any action taken by AI agents.

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DeepSeek and similar generative-AI tools make surveillance technology smarter and cheaper. This will likely allow the CCP to stay in power longer, and propel the export of Chinese AI surveillance systems across the world — to the detriment of global freedom.

[Edit typo.]

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Archived

In his speech, [Chinese leader Xi Jinping] highlighted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation [with Asian countries], and touted ideas of building high-level connectivity networks, enhancing industrial cooperation, advancing security and law enforcement cooperation, and expanding people-to-people exchanges. China is likely to sign a number of agreements as it seeks to deepen ‘all-around cooperation’ with the three Southeast Asian nations. These are likely to include ongoing attention to digital infrastructure, technology, and governance norms-setting under digital cooperation – and risk further entrenching digital repression in the region.

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Vietnam

Vietnam is emblematic of a digital authoritarian state learning from China’s digital governance norms.

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there is a great degree of similarity between the two laws, pointing to China’s influence over the development of Vietnam’s digital governance. Both laws define cybersecurity in a manner that diverges from conventional, rights-based approach, conflating technical infrastructure security with information control — resulting in enhanced censorship. Both laws also take a centralised approach to critical information infrastructure and promote centralised censorship of information critical of the regime. They require data localisation, raising serious risks of surveillance, and include a number of concerning obligations on foreign tech companies. Both laws also promote real name registration, which further compromises right to privacy and anonymity protections, adversely impacting freedom of expression online. Finally, Vietnam’s approach to cybersecurity models China’s emphasis on individual and tech companies’ requirements to act as surveillance extensions of the Party-State apparatus. Subsequent decrees in Vietnam have positioned the law even closer to its Chinese predecessor.

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Cambodia

In early 2022, Cambodia launched its Cambodian Digital Government Policy 2022– 2035, which referred to China as a positive case study in successful digital government, raising concerns about internet freedom in the country. We are likely to see further tightening of this relationship through additional cooperation agreements and memoranda of understanding.

The starkest example of China’s malicious influence over Cambodia’s digital infrastructure and governance space is in the National Internet Gateway (NIG). In February 2021 Cambodia enacted the NIG Sub-Decree, establishing the country’s version of the Great Firewall of China. Article 6 of the Sub-Decree requires telecommunications companies and service providers to route internet traffic through government-controlled and monitored servers ‘to prevent and disconnect all network connections that affect national income, security, social order, morality, culture, traditions, and customs’. Articles 14 and 16 allow government officials to retain traffic data for a year and issue overbroad penalties for non-compliance. Sopheap Chak, former executive director of the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights, has observed that ‘the proposed NIG mirrors that of the Chinese internet gateway’.

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Malaysia

Malaysia is home to the second-largest Chinese overseas community in the world, after Thailand. It is also among the top 10 global recipients of BRI support; relations with China and digital cooperation are common elements of Malaysian politics. [...]

One area where cooperation between China and Malaysia has raised human rights concerns is around partnerships on high-risk Chinese surveillance and artificial intelligence (AI) technology. For example, last year ByteDance, TikTok’s parent company, promised to invest some USD 2,13 billion to develop an AI hub in Malaysia.

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One of the stated objectives outlined the recent Central Work Conference on Diplomacy with Neighbouring Countries has been to expand law enforcement cooperation. This is likely to be among the priorities of Xi Jinping’s trip, and we should expect further discussion on these points in Malaysia. Cooperation on expanding partnership in new and emerging technologies, especially around AI, are likely to also be a focus of the upcoming delegation, as China seeks to both elevate its global norms setting role and further dislodge the United States as a leader in AI technology.

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Western intelligence agencies warned on Tuesday of an increasing threat from Beijing's security services to use malicious mobile phone applications to surveil Taiwanese independence activists, Tibetan rights advocates and others opposed by the Chinese government.

An advisory warned of "the growing threat" posed by malicious surveillance software deployed by a Chengdu-based contractor reported to have ties to China’s Ministry of Public Security. The advisory was signed by cybersecurity agencies in Britain, the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Germany.

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The warning comes amid increasing tensions surrounding Taiwan, including April 1 Chinese military drills around the island and a March 28 visit to the Philippines by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in which he reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to deterring Chinese aggression in the region.

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China is looking to mend a strained trading relationship with the European Union, the last open major market for its products, to weather a trade war with the United States. But diplomats and analysts say breaking a prolonged stalemate won't be easy.

The EU and other major trading partners argue that Chinese overinvestment in manufacturing is flooding the world with goods.

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China's EV exports to Europe were down 15% in January-February from the same months last year, according to China Passenger Car Association data. This extends a 10% decline in 2024, as tariffs of up to 35.3% took effect in October.

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European diplomats, having seen years of discussions that resulted in no progress on key issues including the trade imbalance, market access and reciprocity, are not holding high hopes for a reset.

"It's up to the Chinese to show they're serious about engaging. All existing problems in the trade relationship are within their power to resolve," said one based in Beijing, on condition of anonymity.

Analysts believe China views Europe as politically divided and weak after Trump's re-election, and hopes that tariff pressure from Washington will make member states more open to deepening investment ties with China.

"I don't see any reason why China would be interested in a change other than political and symbolic gains - which is not what the EU wants," said Mathieu Duchatel, Asia Program director at Institut Montaigne, a Paris-based think tank.

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Beijing has mounted a charm offensive in recent months, sending senior diplomats to Brussels in February to raise lifting sanctions on EU lawmakers in exchange for reviving a long-dormant investment deal.

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Top EU leaders will visit Beijing in July for a face-to-face summit with President Xi, an EU Commission spokesperson said on Friday.

This comes after China indicated Xi would not attend the EU-China summit originally planned for Brussels, said one European diplomat, despite travelling to Moscow in May for World War Two commemorations.

"They sense an opportunity for getting concessions, but are not interested in really improving ties since Xi cannot be bothered to travel to Europe," the diplomat said.

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"The ball is very much in China's court, and it will be interesting to see how they choose to play," [says one observer].

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cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4157529

James Robinson, along with Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, has been awarded this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics for his research on the critical role institutions play in fostering national prosperity. In [this Q&A session]l with EL PAÍS, he explains that his work also seeks to highlight how the legacy of colonialism has impeded economic development in certain regions, particularly in Latin America and Africa.

James Robinson: [...] we make a simple division, focusing on the presence of inclusive institutions or extractive institutions. Inclusive institutions create broad incentives and opportunities for all people equally, while extractive institutions concentrate benefits and incentives in the hands of a few. Many economists say that development comes from entrepreneurship and innovation, but in reality it comes from people’s dreams, creativity and aspirations. To be prosperous, you have to create a series of institutions that can cultivate this talent. However, if you look at countries like Colombia or Nigeria, talent is wasted because people do not have opportunities.

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Institutions can be an obstacle to competitiveness. However, one should consider the impact that European integration had on countries such as Spain, Portugal or the former Soviet countries. These are remarkable success stories. There has been an almost unprecedented transition. It is true that there may be too much regulation or inefficient rules, but broadly speaking the effects of European institutions has been largely positive over the past 50 years.

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[Immigration] is one of the big questions we have to solve. [...] it can be difficult. It is not easy to quickly incorporate the millions of people who cross the Mediterranean [trying to reach Europe]. One of the possible ways is to help them develop in order to improve the terrible situation in their own countries. However, one of the biggest complications is that the policies recommended by Western institutions are not in tune with what is happening in these [developing] countries. At the World Bank, for example, you cannot talk about politics. How do we expect them to solve real problems when you cannot talk about them? Frankly, it doesn’t make sense. If we really want to change the world, we have to have honest conversations. I see that as a long way off.

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The reality is that democratic countries have shown that they are better at managing public services and achieving rapid growth. You can find impressive examples like China among autocratic countries, but you cannot achieve an inclusive economy with an authoritarian regime and a model like the Chinese one.

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I don’t think the Chinese model can continue. If you look at other authoritarian regimes, like Iran or Russia, they are incredibly weak economically and technologically. The economy cannot flourish in an authoritarian regime. Right now, technological dynamism is concentrated in one such country and in the Western world. However, one has to consider that, with Donald Trump, the institutions that have made the United States great are being seriously questioned. This could affect the context, and that is why the European Union and NATO are so important.

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[Populism is linked to the growing disconnect between governments and citizens] and an example of this is Latin America. Democracy promised too much and did not always deliver. People’s lives did not change, and they sought new alternatives. There are various factors why democracy has not achieved transformations, such as clientelism and corruption. [...] Venezuela was governed in a deeply corrupt manner, and Hugo Chávez was clever in taking advantage of it. You also see this with Donald Trump, who has gone far because he realized there was widespread dissatisfaction with traditional politics. The failures of democratic institutions are real, and that is why we have to think about how to make them more empathetic to what people need.

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Artificial intelligence can be wonderful, but like all technologies, it depends on how it is used. If artificial intelligence is used to create replacements for humans, that could be devastating. [...] It is all about how it is used, and that depends on our governments. I think that these decisions should not be left to the tech gurus. They only think about what makes them the most money, even if this is not related to the general well-being of society. In the case of artificial intelligence, it is very important, because it could have a tectonic impact on the world.