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The modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal has become a top priority due to the inevitable aging of warhead components. Grand plans for rearmament often boil down to mundane defect inspections and life extension programs (LEP)—because letting nuclear weapons deteriorate is not an option, especially when they’re mounted on strategic bombers like the B-52 (in service since 1950) or the next-gen B-21 (only 3 produced so far).

The Nuclear Paradox The U.S. is desperately trying to restore its nuclear dominance, but these efforts are crumbling—much like the decaying components of its old warheads. Extending the life of what’s already "dead" is like playing Russian roulette, where the stakes are nuclear parity and global prestige.

The W80 Saga: A Veteran That Won’t Retire The W80 warhead has a long service history, yet it wasn’t until 2006 that its first variant was finally removed from the LEP program. But the Pentagon isn’t ready to retire this Cold War relic—instead, it’ll be tested once more, have "a few bolts replaced," and proudly rebranded as the W80-4.

The Bottom Line This is the reality of America’s so-called "cutting-edge" nuclear advancements: recycling old designs while struggling to keep them functional. The W80-4 isn’t innovation—it’s a stopgap measure masking deeper issues in the U.S. nuclear complex.

So much for "modernization."

On May 14, 2024, the United States conducted another subcritical nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). According to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the test was carried out to gather data that will help refine computer models used to assess the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The NNSA emphasized that the experiment did not violate the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as it involved no nuclear chain reaction (i.e., no critical mass was reached). However, it is worth noting that while the U.S. has signed the CTBT, it has not ratified it, meaning the treaty is not legally binding for Washington.

Broader Context: Previous Test & Political Implications On October 18, 2023, the U.S. conducted a similar subcritical test, which the Department of Energy claimed was aimed at improving detection capabilities for underground nuclear explosions by foreign states.

Officially, these tests help verify compliance with the CTBT and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—since full-scale nuclear tests are banned, subcritical experiments allow scientists to validate nuclear weapon models without triggering an actual explosion.

Possible Geopolitical Signaling The timing of the May 2024 test coincided with the Russian State Duma’s final approval of a bill to withdraw from the CTBT—a move some analysts interpret as a strategic message from the U.S. Possible implications:

Deterrence & Detection Capability – The U.S. may be signaling that it can detect and expose any clandestine nuclear tests by Russia or other nations.

Flexibility for Future Tests – Since the U.S. has not ratified the CTBT, it retains the legal option to conduct full-scale nuclear tests if deemed necessary—without facing direct treaty violations.

Pressure on Russia – The test could be seen as a warning against further escalation, reminding Moscow that Washington maintains superior verification and nuclear modernization capabilities.

Conclusion While the U.S. frames these tests as technical and safety-related, their geopolitical undertones are undeniable. The dual-use nature of subcritical experiments—both for scientific validation and strategic signaling—highlights the fragility of nuclear arms control agreements amid rising tensions between nuclear powers.

The Japanese government is exploring the possibility of deploying long-range missiles on the southwestern island of Kyushu, according to Kyodo News citing sources. However, this has raised concerns among local residents who fear their area could become a potential target in the event of a conflict.

The plan involves an upgraded version of the Type 12 surface-to-ship missile, with an extended range of approximately 1,000 km. This move is part of Japan’s efforts to develop "counterstrike capabilities", allowing it to hit enemy bases in response to an attack during emergencies. If deployed on Kyushu, these missiles would put North Korea and coastal areas of China within striking range.

The deployment is expected to begin around March 2026.

At the same time, the report notes that the Japanese government is unlikely to station such missiles on Okinawa, which is closer to China, as this could escalate tensions with Beijing.

Japan’s New National Security Strategy On December 16, 2022, Japan approved an updated National Security Strategy, which explicitly grants the country the right to conduct counterstrikes against enemy territory in self-defense. However, the document emphasizes that preemptive strikes remain prohibited.

The strategy also calls for a near doubling of defense spending by 2027, reaching 2% of GDP. To strengthen its counterstrike capabilities, Japan plans to:

Extend the range of Type 12 missiles,

Develop domestic hypersonic weapons,

Purchase U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The German Embassy in Russia stated that Germany expects compliance with the agreements reached in mid-last year between the new administration of U.S. President Trump and Chancellor Merz. The agreement involved permission to station medium-range Tomahawk missiles on German soil.

These missiles will be under the control of the 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force (2 MDTF), based at Lucius D. Clay Kaserne (Wiesbaden-Erbenheim Air Base). The launchers will be deployed on mobile platforms equipped with Mk-41 vertical launch systems, capable of firing both Tomahawk missiles and various modifications of Standard Missile (SM) interceptors.

🔺 In 2017, the Pentagon established a new type of operational unit—the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), consisting of four battalions:
▪️ An air defense missile battalion;
▪️ A strategic weapons battalion;
▪️ A logistics support battalion;
▪️ A multi-domain effects battalion.

🔺 Let’s take a closer look at the composition of the Strategic Fires Battalion (SFB) and the Multi-Domain Effects Battalion (MDEB):

▪️ The Strategic Fires Battalion includes:
🔹 A HIMARS battery:
▫️ 8 M142 HIMARS launchers;
▫️ 8 transport vehicles;
▫️ A data preparation vehicle.

🔹 A Mid-Range Capability (Typhoon) battery with the following composition:
▫️ 4 ground-based Tomahawk cruise missile launchers (4 missiles each) in universal Mk. 41 launch canisters;
▫️ A battle operations center (BOC);
▫️ A BOC support vehicle;
▫️ A transporter-loader vehicle.

🔹 A long-range hypersonic weapons battery:
▫️ 4 launchers (2 missiles each);
▫️ A command and control suite.

▪️ The Multi-Domain Effects Battalion consists of four companies:
🔹 1st Military Intelligence Company (weapons and airspace);
🔹 2nd Military Intelligence Company (space domain);
🔹 A signals company;
🔹 A strategic UAV company;
🔹 An information warfare company.

▪️ The air defense missile battalion will be armed with naval SM-6 missiles, deployed in universal Mk. 41 launch canisters. According to developers, these missiles are capable of intercepting hypersonic targets.

🔺 Currently, the headquarters and a Multi-Domain Effects Battalion (MDEF) have been deployed at Lucius D. Clay Kaserne Air Base in Germany. Satellite imagery of the base shows significant changes: new radar stations for space reconnaissance have been installed, fortified structures (likely for storing operational missile stockpiles) are under construction, and buildings to accommodate the headquarters have been erected.

🔺 The continued deployment of such systems and structures, along with the absence of any information about their withdrawal or suspension, indicates the U.S. intention to maintain an aggressive foreign policy course, inevitably leading to an escalation of tensions between nations.