Europe Pub

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52948584

Archived

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In 2023, Lyndon Li, an activist with political connections, was followed by a Chinese man to his London church. The man had previously befriended Hong Kong activists and collected personal information on some of them. In a pub in the capital, Li says the man, who was called Harrison Chan, offered him money to infiltrate the Conservative party.

“He said China will be the future,” Li recalled. “Britain will fall.”

[...]

Since 2020, China has ramped up a campaign of intimidation, infiltration, harassment and violence against free speech activists operating in the UK. China experts warned that the programme is a part of a global project to stamp out dissent. “It’s widespread,” Laura Harth, the China director at human rights NGO Safeguard Defenders, said. “The aim is to try and control the entire overseas Chinese community.”

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More than a dozen UK-based dissidents [...] say they have been the victims of so-called transnational repression. They include a former elected politician, an exiled lawmaker, several student activists and journalists, a trade union organiser, a policy researcher, two artists, a musician and a young asylum seeker rebuilding his life.

Almost all the dissidents said they believed that repression in the UK has increased sharply in the last few years.

“If you said to the Hong Kong community 10 years ago: ‘Are you being repressed?’, the answer would have been no,” said Labour MP Alex Sobel, the joint author of a cross-party report on transnational repression. “That is completely different now.”

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Hong Kong claims its economic and trade offices promote commerce but dissidents believe the Communist party also uses them as a base to track dissidents. In addition to its outpost in London, Hong Kong maintains HKETOs in New York City, San Francisco and Washington DC.

Anna Kwok, of the Washington-based Hong Kong Democracy Council, warned that Beijing can use these diplomatic outposts to carry out transnational repression in the US. In 2024 a bipartisan bill passed giving the president authority to shut the HKETOs down.

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Many activists who fled to the UK have continued to criticise China’s communist leadership, leaving them open to ongoing targeting. A recent parliamentary report, co-written by Sobel, concluded that China runs “the most comprehensive transnational repression campaign of any foreign state operating in the UK”.

Hong Kong Watch, a UK NGO, shared a survey of 1,000 Hong Kongers exclusively with The Observer. The survey found that almost one-fifth had experienced some form of transnational repression, such as being photographed at protests or seeing sensitive information about them published online.

“China doesn’t need to [assassinate people],” Laura Harth said. “That activity creates international backlash, and the cost is much higher. You can achieve your objectives by grey-zone tactics that evade the scrutiny of local authorities.”

[...]

Finn Lau, the activist who was beaten up, said there were “more and more concerns that the Hong Kong community could be sacrificed in exchange for economic benefits”.

The government has said that its policy on China is to “cooperate where we can, compete where we need to and challenge where we must”. It has said intelligence agencies had concluded that threats stemming from the planned embassy were being “appropriately managed”.

[...]

Chloe Cheung, the young Hong Kong activist, was followed by two men who appeared to be of Chinese origin as she left a 2024 [protest] event in London. She reported the incident to the Met but received no response. On Christmas Eve 2024, Cheung, who had just finished her A-levels, had a bounty placed on her head by Chinese authorities: a £94,000 reward for anyone who could assist in her arrest and capture.

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Another female dissident was offered a fake doorbell camera after her family was sent letters threatening that she would be raped if she didn’t stop her advocacy work.

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Viktor Orban's Fidesz government in Hungary stands accused of mass voter intimidation in a film released on Thursday ahead of 12 April parliamentary elections, in which the ruling party is trailing in the opinion polls.

The Price of the Vote documentary film, which aired on Thursday evening at a Budapest cinema and on YouTube, presents the results of a six-month investigation by independent filmmakers and reporters.

In the film, voters, mayors, former election officials and a police officer claim that large sums of money and even illegal drugs are being offered to pressure people to vote for Fidesz.

Fifty-three of Hungary's 106 individual constituencies and up to 600,000 voters are targeted, the film alleges – potentially 10% of the expected turnout of six million.

After 16 years of Fidesz rule under Orban, most recent polls indicate that the party is trailing Peter Magyar's centre-right opposition party Tisza by at least that margin.

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All the constituencies involved are rural or small-town communities, increasingly dominated by Fidesz since 2010.

The film portrays a rural Hungary made up of a patchwork of poor villages, home especially to the country's large Roma minority.

Local mayors exercise an iron grip over daily lives, providing work, firewood, transport to polling stations and, in one case, even access to medicine, in exchange for the "correct" vote on election day, according to claims made in the film.

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The sheer extent of the practice, and the similarity of the stories in villages tens or hundreds of kilometres apart led the filmmakers to conclude that the action is planned by senior Fidesz officials.

"In the beginning, we thought the key piece of this process is vote-buying. But then we realised that the money is just the icing on the cake. The key word here is dependency and vulnerability," Aron Timar, one of the filmmakers, told the BBC.

"The money comes in on a pretty serious scale, and with quite a large entourage," says one interviewee, a serving police officer whose face and voice is disguised, in the documentary.

"I didn't become a police officer to serve a corrupt system. To help cover things up."

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For voters offered money, the sum mentioned is usually 50-60,000 forints (£110-£133) per vote - a significant sum in communities where child benefit is only £26-£43 per child per month.

But the filmmakers emphasise that what they describe is far more than a vote-buying operation.

At previous elections, some of the villages cited in the film have recorded votes of 80%-100% for Fidesz.

Practices alleged by characters in the film include the provision of cars and minibuses on election day, voters pretending to be illiterate in order to obtain a "companion" in the voting booth, photographs of voting slips to prove a vote for Fidesz, and chain voting.

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Independent media, and the opposition Tisza party, allege Russian involvement in support of Orban, who is seen as Vladimir Putin's closest partner in the European Union.

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Taiwan yesterday called on Denmark to correct its designation of the nationality of Taiwanese residents as “China” or face retaliatory measures.

The Danish government in 2024 changed the nationality of Taiwanese citizens on their residence permits from “Taiwan” to “China.”

The decision goes against EU foreign policy and contravenes democratic and human rights principles, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) spokesman Hsiao Kuang-wei (蕭光偉) said.

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Denmark should present a solution acceptable to Taiwan as soon as possible and correct the erroneous designation to preserve the longstanding friendship between the two nations, Hsiao said.

The issue could damage Denmark’s image and business reputation in Taiwan, harming the relationship between the two countries, as well as prospects for cooperation, he added.

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Denmark is the only country in the EU to list Taiwanese residents’ nationality as China, the Danish news platform Berlingske reported on Friday.

Taiwanese living in Denmark have protested to the Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration (SIRI) since the change was made in 2024, but no corrections have been made, the report said.

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The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not changed its position on Taiwan and the practice is inconsistent between ministries and clearly contravenes EU policy, Representative to Denmark Robin Cheng (鄭榮俊) said.

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Finns now place roughly as much trust in the United States as in China or Russia, according to a poll published on Tuesday.

The survey was commissioned by discussion forum SuomiAreena and the Nordic Council of Ministers, and carried out by research firm Verian.

Antti Lehtinen, who heads SuomiAreena, said it was not surprising that trust in the United States has weakened.

"But it is striking that trust has fallen to roughly the same level as that accorded to China and Russia," he said.

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Only four percent of respondents said they trust the United States. Trust levels were even lower for China at three percent, and for Russia at just one percent.

At the same time, the study found that Finns regard Nato as the most trustworthy international institution, even though the United States has traditionally played a leading role within the alliance.

Finns are, however, feeling more confident about their Nordic neighbours.

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"We do not trust the East or the United States. Leadership in Europe is not particularly strong at the moment. So it's natural that the Nordic countries are trending," Lehtinen explained.

The survey, which drew responses from some 1,000 people, was carried out ahead of the US attack on Iran.

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Since the ‘chat control’ proposal was first presented, CEPIS has been repeatedly insisting that renewing blanket scanning powers would represent a fundamental breach of privacy rights for 450 million Europeans while failing to deliver meaningful child protection outcomes:

No proven effectiveness: The European Commission’s own 2025 report has found no demonstrated link between mass scanning of private messages and successful prosecutions or child rescues. Offenders can easily evade these measures by shifting to unscanned platforms.

High error rates and technical unreliability: AI‑based classifiers for images and text show error rates of up to 20%, while research has demonstrated that widely used perceptual hashing systems such as PhotoDNA can be manipulated to evade detection or generate false reports. These systems cannot assess context or intent and risk overwhelming law‑enforcement authorities with non‑actionable alerts.

Legal pathways already exist: Even without the extension of Chat Control 1.0, police retain full capability to scan public posts and hosted content, perform targeted interception with judicial oversight, and act on user reports—ensuring no “legal gap” in child‑protection efforts.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/44763012

There is a pretty big movement in Denmark that tried to avoid US products and companies based in Denmark. I assume this is why they have launched a massive campaign where they use local sayings in a humorous way.

You can read more and see more examples here:

https://markedsforing.dk/artikler/nyheder/coca-cola-leger-med-sproget-stoerste-rent-danske-kampagne-nogensinde/

Are there any other similar attempts where you are, where they or other US companies try to regain market share?

Crossposted from https://sopuli.xyz/post/43075983

Edited to add more data (sorry Vatican City, you were not on the map app I used, but you are a no)

romania.europalibera.org/a/par…

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/49525919

A new regional network ... is working to enhance understanding of the common security challenges facing the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic.

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The Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic Hub for Shared Security Challenges is a virtual network connecting think tanks and universities from Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and Japan (and in the next phase, also from Allied countries) and NATO countries interested in enhancing understanding of common challenges between the two regions. This public engagement initiative is supported by a grant from NATO Headquarters and it is open to relevant stakeholders from the two regions, according to a statement by the NATO.

The network currently involves:

—Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute; National Security College at the Australian National University.

—Japan: Economic Security Intelligence Lab, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo; Japan Institute of International Affairs; Keio Center for Strategy at Keio University.

—New Zealand: Centre for Strategic Studies; New Zealand Institute of International Affairs; Asia New Zealand Foundation.

—Republic of Korea: Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies; Hankuk University of Foreign Studies; The Sejong Institute; East Asia Institute.

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Web Archive link

Russia, China, and Iran are the primary external threats to Sweden, the Swedish Security Service (SAPO) stated in its annual report assessing the country’s security landscape.

SAPO noted a rising threat from a Russian state increasingly willing to take risks, particularly in support of its war in Ukraine. The report highlighted Russia’s use of destabilizing hybrid operations across Europe as a key concern for Swedish authorities.

“Iran has also long been labelled a serious threat, and authorities have noted how criminal networks in Sweden, which has spent the past decade dealing with a wave of gang-related crime, have been used by state actors to carry out violent acts,” the report stated.

Charlotte von Essen, head of SAPO, emphasized the impact of regional developments on Sweden’s security environment: “The U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran, and the countermeasures carried out by Iran, have increased the threat against American, Israeli and Jewish targets in Sweden.”

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Web Archive link

Archived

The scale and intensity of Chinese interference in Europe’s information space is rising, a report by European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) has found.

Russian efforts at foreign manipulation across Europe are well recognised, but China is now catching up. And it has its own very particular ways of interfering in the European information space—“borrowing mouths” of useful locals; getting “news” articles repurposed across outlets hungry for content; and spreading “facts” that become accepted as truth. These accompany China’s self-promotion as the inevitable coming power: images of Chinese high-speed rail and new cities interweave with messages casting doubt on the future of Western democracy and progress.

[There is also a brief summary of the report by Propastop, a volunteer-run anti-propaganda organization.]

The report describes several recurring techniques used by the Chinese Communist Party:

‘Borrowed mouths’: Chinese messages are often spread by local opinion leaders, such as journalists, academics, or influencers. Because the message does not come directly from a Chinese state institution but through a local individual, it comes across as more credible.

Sponsored collaboration is frequently used for this purpose: paid posts, covered trips, or other benefits whose aim is to shape a more positive image of China. This is not incidental cooperation but a deliberate strategy in which the credibility of messages is built through their apparent ‘local’ origin.

Information laundering: Narratives created in Chinese state media do not necessarily reach European audiences directly. Instead, they travel through various channels, such as smaller media outlets, blogs, or third-party platforms. Each step reduces the visibility of the original source.

The result is content that appears to be part of local media or analysis, even though its roots extend back to Chinese state communication structures.

Message concealment (cloaking): This technique differs from information laundering in that content does not travel through multiple intermediaries; instead, its true origin is concealed from the outset.

Content produced by Chinese state media may appear in the European information environment in a form that gives the impression of an independent or local source. For example, articles or videos may be produced by Chinese state structures but presented in a way that does not indicate their true origin.

This approach makes influence operations particularly difficult to detect, as the audience has no means of assessing the actual origin and interests behind the source.

‘Bait-and-switch’: Some accounts initially build a following with neutral content, such as travel or cultural topics. Once an audience has formed and trust has been established, the same channels gradually begin sharing political messages as well.

This approach makes it possible to reach people who would not consciously seek out or consume political propaganda.

Amplification of existing messages: China does not always create new narratives but frequently exploits existing debates.

According to ECFR, Chinese channels actively amplify the views of European politicians, activists, and opinion leaders when these align with Chinese interests. For example, criticism of NATO, the European Union, or the United States may gain greater international reach through Chinese media channels.

In this way, China does not need to create the message itself — it is sufficient to highlight existing opinions and increase their international resonance.”

What Stories Are Being Spread?

According to the report, China does not spread random messages in Europe but rather recurring and clearly distinguishable narratives.

• China as a stable and successful great power — Chinese state communication portrays the country as economically successful, technologically advanced, and politically stable. The aim is to present China as a functioning alternative to the Western democratic model.

• The political and economic decline of the West — A second recurring narrative focuses on the problems of Europe and the United States. Political polarisation, economic difficulties, and social tensions are emphasised in order to create the impression of a weakening Western system.

• Reframing Russian aggression — The Chinese media space circulates a narrative according to which the war in Ukraine is not solely Russia’s responsibility, but in which NATO expansion played a role in its genesis. ___

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/49416069

TL;DR:

• While officially there is no trade between temporarily occupied territories in Ukraine and China, Beijing is quietly building an informal network of businesses across these Ukrainian territories
• Experts say that rebuilding control over these regions will require dismantling entrenched shadow networks, replacing critical infrastructure dependent on Chinese technology, and restoring transparent financial systems

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The economies of Russian-occupied territories in eastern and southern Ukraine are increasingly integrating into an alternative economic system shaped by China, supported by shadow financial networks and indirect supply chains, [according to a] report by the Eastern Human Rights Group.

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At the Karansky quarry near Mariupol, Chinese-backed equipment and technical support have enabled the launch of new production facilities. Similar patterns are seen across the coal sector, where Chinese machinery – including tunneling equipment – is now widely used.

“We identified a range of Chinese business partners. It is unlikely that even private companies would engage in such activities without at least tacit approval from Beijing,” said Vira Yastrebova, head of the Eastern Human Rights Group.

Chinese delegations have also reportedly visited industrial sites in the occupied territories, while negotiations continue with Chinese state-linked firms over metallurgy and energy projects.

In addition, the Chinese yuan is increasingly used as a parallel currency for both transactions and savings. At the same time, cryptocurrency – particularly the stablecoin USDT – has become a key tool for cross-border payments.

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Informal mechanisms are also widespread, including transfers via Chinese apps like Alipay and WeChat, as well as intermediary-based “friend transactions.” “A parallel financial system is taking shape – one that operates without transparency, regulatory oversight, or reliable legal protections,” the report states.

While these systems allow economic activity to continue, they come at a cost. According to the report,

• up to 80% of Russian transactions are rejected by major Chinese banks;
• around 79 bank branches in occupied territories officially sell cash yuan;
• approximately 6,000 mobile base stations in the occupied south and east operate on Chinese equipment;
• businesses pay between 8% and 15% in additional fees to intermediaries facilitating transactions and deliveries.

Direct trade between China and the occupied territories officially does not exist. However, the report outlines a multilayered logistics model that allows goods to reach the region indirectly.

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Analysts warn that these transformations are not temporary. The occupied territories are gradually integrating into a China-centered economic ecosystem, raising significant challenges for any future reintegration into Ukraine. “Russia destroys what it can, and what remains is handed over to interested companies – mostly from China. This is no longer only about war, but about what reintegration will look like,” Yastrebova said.

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Web Archive link

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/49348810

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Forcing Ukraine to relinquish the Donbas would dismantle its defensive shield, which together with the army, broader society considers an internal security guarantee. Rather than de-escalate the conflict, it would provide Russia with fortified ground, logistics hubs and forward operating depth, enabling it to regroup and prepare further offensives from a dramatically stronger position. A Russia that gains territory through coercion will use any pause not to reconcile, but to rearm.

It also violates a core principle of international law: borders cannot be changed by force. If conquest succeeds in Ukraine, other revisionist powers will conclude that war pays. Framing the Donbas as a bargaining chip also ignores the lived experience of Russian occupation. It treats territory as a bargaining chip while ignoring the people who live there.

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Millions of Ukrainians live under Russian occupation across parts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk, along with the areas of the Donbas and Crimea. Their experience of Russian rule offers a clear indication of what further territorial concessions would entail.

Human rights organisations have documented widespread abuses in Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories, including mass repression, forced deportations, filtration camps, torture, disappearances and the systematic eradication of Ukrainian language and culture. The Kremlin is implementing a comprehensive campaign to erase Ukrainian statehood and identity – an ethnic cleansing in plain sight.

Russia’s coercive ‘passportisation’ policies deny access to employment, mortgages, home ownership, school enrollment and healthcare – including to critical medicine and other basic services – to anyone not holding Russian papers. Residents are also forcibly conscripted into the occupying Russian military, which is a war crime.

Education systems now impose the Russian curriculum, while Ukrainian language instruction has been banned. Tens of thousands of children have been deported to Russia or subjected to so-called ‘re-education’ programmes, including via ‘summer’ or ‘holiday’ camps. Disinformation is widespread on Telegram and other social media communities, which have become powerful tools to foster loyalty to Russia.

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Territorial concessions do not bring lasting peace. They create temporary, unstable ceasefire lines which Russia transforms into militarised enclaves to exploit in future escalation.

There is also a question of democratic legitimacy. Ukrainians have endured extraordinary hardship since the start of the war, yet public opinion repeatedly shows strong resistance to trading land for so-called peace. This reflects a widely shared understanding that surrendering territory under military pressure would reward aggression and leave Ukraine permanently vulnerable. Pressuring Ukraine to hand over land undermines its sovereignty and agency.

Wars do not end simply because one side seeks peace. They end when aggression fails. Peace without justice and security is an illusion. When Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2014 was rewarded with limited consequences – it returned stronger. Rewarding further territory would only embolden an even more dangerous aggressor.

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Web Archive link

It’s interesting that roaming charges were eliminated in the EU when roaming from one member state to another. In principle, this could be great for consumers so that competition sufficiently suppresses unreasonable GSM costs.

But then the EU brought in what they call a “fair use” law. This blocks continuous roaming. Which effectively denies consumers the benefits of competition.

In Belgium we have only 3 real GSM carriers. The rest are MVNOs. So we get shitty deals on prepaid service.

www.iot-sim.tech has a quite interesting deal: 1gb for 10 years for €10. The raw price per gig is bad, but the credit persists for 10 years which is quite generous compared to all options in Belgium (use-it-or-lose-it in 1 year).

So as a consequence, iot-sim.tech has a rule that the comms can only be used IOT or M2M, perhaps due to some strange exception. But that’s a bit of a perverse outcome because it really should not matter whether the signal is “personal” or not.