For example, one of the first vulnerabilities I found, that was used for the introduction hook in the 39c3 talk, remains unpatched to this day. Instead of being fixed with code, Werner Koch - the main developer of GnuPG - published a blog post declaring the widely-used feature being "harmful"; while they had weeks in advance, they published this on day one of 39c3, not even giving us time to respond.

what the actual fuck

Is there another thing to use? At least for the flow(s) of "encrypt, transfer, decrypt" or "sign, transfer, verify" for binary files. BSD licensed, preferably.

EDIT: minisign was mentioned on the talk... not in the most positive way but would still trust (after they get their shit together of course); however would never trust "age" with what they did

Somewhat reminded of @jonah@neat.computer's general recommendation against GPG (for other reasons than what this talk is about)

Alright, so just because a plain text signature is along with content, doesn't mean that the content is signed.
Then how do you check that the content is signed by the plain-text signature given with it?

I thought that the signature means that either a whole copy of the text is encrypted or a hash of the text is encrypted using the private key, which would mean that spoofing the sign would require solving complexity equal to either of:

• Finding another string that gives the same hash
• Finding the private key and signing a new hash with it

What am I missing?

Yeah, GPG is a dumpster fire. It’s security theatre at its finest.