That doesn't work in reality, as evidenced here, it's far more likely people compromise their security for convenience than the other way around.

Also sometimes opsec requires in get messages from certain chats quickly. Knowing where ICE are in a timely manner is important.

It’s both. Governments have started subpoenaing the push notification servers for data, instead of targeting individual devices. That little pop-in that says who the message was from, and maybe a little bit of the body of the text? Yeah, the push notification server handled that, and the government has access to that server. So any notification you see on your screen, you can be pretty positive that the government has also seen.

But this is about the notification data being stored in a part of the phone that isn’t encrypted. Signal is (or at least claims to be) E2E encrypted, so it shouldn’t be possible for a warrant to get access to the messages in the app. But since the phone is storing those notifications in a separate area (which isn’t encrypted), the warrant was able to read them.

The point is that there are two different attack vectors, and you should harden your device against both.

Source? I am not seeing anything about that. The only problem I have seen on Android is when applications use firebase for notifications, which is most play store apps to be fair, just no FDroid apps or some privacy preserving apps