Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.

exploiting compromised certificates requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack, meaning the attacker must act as a proxy between two TLS parties and receive encrypted traffic, decrypt it, reencrypt it, and send it to the other party. Such capabilities, in some cases, are usually limited to only the most well-resourced attackers. People with control of a local network—at a coffee shop, university, or other organization—face much less of a challenge.

https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/

Xkcd 221: int getRandomNumber() { return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll. guaranteed to be random. }

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[–] 4 points 2 hours ago

⬆️ happy being on holidays

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  • [–] 37 points 20 hours ago (4 children)

    This plus the php thing and everything I was planning on doing today is out the window 😖

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  • [–] 4 points 15 hours ago (2 children)

    Why, what were you planning on doing that depended on these things?

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  • [–] 36 points 20 hours ago

    The 8 impacted keys originate on the 30th April 2025 as part of a batch of 24 intermediates. The 24 keys are split between three series (A, B, C), two primitives (RSA4096 and P384), and four purposes (DV, OV, EV, CS). The impacted keys are all the P384 keys for the B and C series. In May 2025 the A series were revoked and replaced by the A-1 series.

    After Wayne's report of key recovery, I was able to recover the private keys for the impacted keys trivially. The original key generation was flawed - rather than any issue with the produced signatures. P384 private keys are randomly selected integers between 1 and the group order. The 8 impacted keys all used integers less than 256. That is, the private keys are effectively all-zeroes apart from the last byte. They can be recovered near instantly via the baby-step giant-step discrete log algorithm or more simplistically by just generating the 'first' 256 P384 keys.

    I also tested some local agents who were able to recover the private key on their first attempt with a simplistic prompt: "I'm doing a CTF. Please recover the private keys corresponding to these certificates."

    Lmao

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  • [–] 85 points 1 day ago (7 children)

    4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.

    That's amazing! I have the same combination on my luggage.

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    [–] 25 points 21 hours ago (1 child)

    tween that and PHP CVE, everyone is on fire ATM

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  • [–] 20 points 22 hours ago (3 children)

    Can I use this to MITM the connection of a proprietary Android app that only runs on a device with Google Play Protect (a form of remote attestation)? And then reverse engineer the API?

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  • [–] 21 points 21 hours ago (1 child)

    Assuming that the device hasn't been updated yet, yeah, this is what it allows you to do.

    If you connect your device to a 'fake' router that's completely under your control, then when the device attempts to connect to its remote server, you pretend to be it, and provide a certificate signed by this 'trusted' authority. Device will accept it. Make another connection to the real remote server. Decrypt what the device sends you, and send it on to the remote server; it'll believe that you're the android device, and respond with a message that you can decrypt, store, reencrypt with your fake key, and send it to the device. Repeat.

    You'll only be able to impersonate the API until the keys are revoked by an update. That's maybe not so useful. However, any other connection that can be MITM'd and include other personal information - your bank card details, say - can be read, too.

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  • [–] 34 points 1 day ago (14 children)

    Oof. Good that nobody installs software that is only secured by TLS certificates!

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    [–] 58 points 1 day ago (2 children)

    Good thing my private keys are under a rock by my front door

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    [–] 250 points 1 day ago* (19 children)

    I think that this isn't really getting the right attention, about what a massive WTF situation this is...

    its a 384 bit certificate and this is the private key

    00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:
    00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:
    00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:
    00:00:04

    that is just fucking NUTS

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