In the US, if cops get into a phone before a warrant, even if a warrant is issued later, all evidence from the phone is suppressed as illegally obtained.
This is a bigger concern with respect to intelligence agencies who conduct mass surveillance.
In the US, if cops get into a phone before a warrant, even if a warrant is issued later, all evidence from the phone is suppressed as illegally obtained.
This is a bigger concern with respect to intelligence agencies who conduct mass surveillance.
If only we could see what apple was doing under the hood. If only companies that constantly pat themselves on the back for being secure could be open source.
Wasn't there a vulnerability in the chips apple uses for USB?
For chips released in 2018 and 2019. To the best of my knowledge anything newer than a iPhone 11 nothing has yet been found and announced. So 7 years ago. That said you know that if there is some unannounced vulnerability and some spyware company or government knows of it, they are not going to report it.
Reminder: if you anticipate being in contact with law enforcement and have any spare moments at all: restart your phone and do not unlock it. This “before first unlock” (BFU) state does not yet have auth keys loaded and secrets decrypted in active memory, and is thus rather more difficult to exploit and gain entry to.
So, y'all gonna switch to GrapheneOS now?
The companies who sell these bypass devices spend time on graphene too, don’t worry.
The price of iOS exploits would suggest Apple’s doing a pretty good job in this area.
I'm sure they do spend time on Graphene OS, but that's not the same as being successful in cracking it.
I wonder if they spend time on Linux mobile devices, considering how niche they are.
But then again, security through obscurity is not real security, and I'm not aware of any reasonable way to run something like QubesOS on a phone in any way that would be usable.
I'm sure they spend time on Linux in general, since it is the most common operating system (and includes Android, so even bigger). I doubt they spend much, if any, effort on the specific subset of systems that make a Linux phone different from another Linux device.
Well, I expect this to be patched asap now that it has leaked. Apple has been quick to patch things when such leaks happen. Hopefully that’s the case here too.
I have a family member who is a cop, and they told me this was possible months ago. I doubt Apple doesn't know
If Apple really cared, they would make it so that a Shortcut that performed the Reboot action was allowed to run on a schedule, unattended. But no, that’s specifically disallowed.
I assume that would just be shutting down the phone. When it boots up it required the passcode, which is what they want to bypass here
No, this preserves the phone in an "after first unlock" state. They specifically dont want a phone to reboot or shutdown because then the encryption keys get dumped from memory and require the password to decrypt the keys.
Most smartphones encrypt the majority of their storage these days.
This means there are two states the phone can be in.
BFU, or Before First Unlock, is the most secure. When you power on the phone it has just enough software in unencrypted storage to come on, initialize its hardware, start some background processes, and display an unlock screen. This is the most secure state for the phone. When you type in your password, the password itself decrypts the actual key which is used to decrypt the main storage. Without that password, the data is essentially useless as it cannot be decrypted. Also, most phones are now set up so that if you try the wrong password 10 times, it will erase the main storage encryption key which means the data is completely unrecoverable forever. In general, it doesn't matter what you can exploit BFU because there's very little running to exploit and the storage encryption key is usually stored in a secure enclave, that is a special part of a chip that is designed to resist tampering.
Once you type in your password the first time, the phone is AFU, or After First Unlock. The key to access main storage is held in memory, it is being actively used to read and write from that storage as software is running on the phone like email, background apps, etc. The prompt to unlock the phone looks exactly the same, but in reality the phone is in a much less secure state. There's plenty of software, both system and apps, running for you to try to exploit.
The point here is that if you set the phone to regularly reboot, or to reboot if you haven't logged in in a day or two, each time it reboots it switches back to BFU state.
And so if some government agency has arrested you and seized your phone, you want that reboot to happen because if the phone automatically reboots before they manage to get into it, it becomes much much harder for them to get in.
Bring back the power hard switch. Problem solved.
And a removable battery. One I can guarantee the battery will pop off if I accidentally drop it while my hands are in the air.
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